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It has been taken for granted that Hafez al-Asad relies
exclusively upon an iron fist to perpetuate the survival of his regime.
Close scrutiny of Asad's presidency, however, betrays the inadequacy
of this explanation. In fact, Syria's conflict with Israel is the primary
legitimizing agent for Asad's minority-Alawi regime, and it is
because of this conflict that Asad's regime has endured.
Consequently, the absence of a militant confrontation with Israel
poses risks which the present Syrian leadership has been unwilling
to assume. Furthermore, this condition acts as a restraint upon
certain types of foreign policy activities and initiatives which Asad
might otherwise elect to pursue. The reality of Israel's legitimizing
function has specific relevance to U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis both
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The tenure of Hafez al-Asad is perhaps the most enigmatic
aberration in the post-World War II history of Syria.
Emerging from a legacy of failed coups and political
instability, Asad has managed to retain a stranglehold on
power for over two decades. Indeed, Asad's long-established
presidency might lead one to posit that the string of coups
and counter-coups that prefaced his rise to power were in fact
the real aberration in Syria's recent history.
Whatever the case, Asad's longevity is that much more
noteworthy when one considers that "the entire Asad tenure has
been accompanied by Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights,
and that after 1970 Syria experienced one major Middle East
war, attained and then lost an important degree of regional
leadership, and lived under the domination of a small and
unpopular religious minority group." [Ref. 1]
It has been taken for granted--for too long, by too many--
that Hafez al-Asad relies exclusively upon an iron fist to
perpetuate the survival of his .regime. Close scrutiny of
Asad's presidency betrays the inadequacy of this explanation.
Unbridled cruelty and repression are certainly utilized
against those who dare to challenge Asad, but it is
unreasonable to believe that these are the only means--or the
most effective ones--at Asad's disposal.
Conventional explanations for the evident stability of the
present Syrian regime are for the most part inadequate.
Although there is little doubt that the current leadership
relies heavily upon the armed forces to maintain its
domestic predominance, it seems implausible to argue that
Hafez al-Asad and his associates rule the country through
brute force alone. [Ref. 2]
By what means, then, does Asad maintain his position? It
is the ambition of this essay to demonstrate that Syria's
conflict with Israel is the primary legitimizing agent for
Asad's minority-Alawi regime. The absence of a militant
confrontation with Israel poses risks which the present Syrian
leadership has been unwilling to assume. This condition acts
as a restraint upon certain types of foreign policy activities
and initiatives which Asad might otherwise elect to pursue.
Asad's dependence upon Israel as a legitimizing agent not
only explains Syria's continuing intransigence regarding peace
negotiations, for example, but also raises a number of
important and pertinent questions regarding US foreign policy
conduct. Among them: Is a meaningful Syrian-Israeli peace a
realistic goal of US policy? And what are the implications
for the US vis-a-vis a successor to the chronically ailing
Asad?
These questions and, others will be addressed in greater
detail later, the first priority being to establish the
veracity of this paper's argument. In this pursuit, several
topic areas must be discussed. First, one must appreciate why
legitimacy is a commodity that is important to Asad, and yet,
at the same time, so difficult to obtain. Because of his
Alawi background, Asad's legitimacy is constantly challenged
despite any success his policies might enjoy.
Second, the contest with Israel is not the only
legitimizing agent available to Asad. Indeed, he has
endeavored to use a variety of institutions, ideas, and
ambitions to achieve a degree of legitimacy with the Syrian
people; these include, among others, the Baath party, pan-
Arabism, and the notion of Greater Syria. It will be
demonstrated that these alternative legitimizing agents are
either insufficient for the task, and have proven themselves
so in the past, or otherwise derive their strength through
attachment to anti-Israeli sentiments, thereby making the
conflict with Israel primary in the hierarchy of legitimizing
themes
.
Third, Asad's dependence upon anti-Israeli themes during
periods of crisis will be elucidated. These crises include
the confrontation with devout Muslims during the creation of
the Syrian constitution in 1973, and the period of uprisings
which led to the infamous slaughter at Hama in 1982 and the
attendant suppression of the Muslim Brethren.
Finally, Asad has pursued a number of activities which
seemingly contradict the argument of this paper. Among these
are: Syria's armed intervention in Lebanon in 1976; Syrian
participation in the US-led international coalition opposing
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; and Syria's involvement in the
subsequent peace process. It will be demonstrated that none
of these policy actions, in fact, contradict the exposition
offered in these pages, or diminish its strength. Indeed,
refuting these points will buttress the argument that Israel
is the primary source of legitimacy for Asad's regime.
Only after having accomplished these tasks will it be
appropriate to discuss implications for US policy. But before
diving headlong into this process it would be wise to clarify
the meaning of a term which, heretofore, has been bandied
about all too recklessly. That term is legitimacy
.
Legitimacy is rarely discussed in the context of Syrian
politics because of the predisposition to view Syrian
leadership as dependent upon coercive measures to maintain
power. Because this widely-held assumption will be challenged
in the course of this essay, it is imperative to understand
what is meant by "political" legitimacy. In its most simple
form, political legitimacy "refers to the basis on which the
exercise of political authority is established. A system is
legitimate when its decisions are generally and widely
accepted as just and proper by major groups in the system.
"
[Ref. 3]
This generic definition fails to convey with sufficient
urgency the importance of legitimacy to the stability of any
government, not to mention those which are prone to chaos and
disorder--as is Syria's. David Easton's writings on the
subject do it greater justice:
The inculcation of a sense of legitimacy is probably the
single most effective device for regulating the flow of
diffuse support in favor both of the authorities and of
the regime. A member may be willing to obey the
authorities and conform to the requirements of the regime
for many different reasons. But the most stable support
will derive from the conviction on the part of the member
that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the
authorities and to abide by the requirements of the
regime. It reflects the fact that in some vague or
explicit way he sees these objects as conforming to his
own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and
proper in the political sphere. The strength of support
implicit in this attitude derives from the fact that it is
not contingent on specific inducements or rewards of any
kind, except in the very long run. [Ref. 4]
Although not delineating a straightforward definition of
legitimacy, Easton's discourse provides a better overall sense
of the important role legitimacy plays--where it exists--in
maintaining the good order which is a prerequisite for the
authoritative execution of government policy.
Michael Hudson proffers thoughts on legitimacy more
relevant to the context of Arab politics:
A strong personal leader may generate legitimacy for a
regime or an entire system. The regime or opposition
movement that succeeds in identifying itself with a highly
salient ideological program may win positive support.
Certainly in the Arab world those leaders who successfully
associate themselves with the fulfillment of abstract but
highly valued goals pertaining to sacred obligations,
corporate identity, or deeply valued principles are likely
to last longer and perform better than those who can
induce compliance only on the basis of fear or expediency.
[Ref. 5]
Hudson's reflections on legitimacy are certainly applicable to
Syria. Asad is unquestionably a "strong personal leader."
Furthermore, Asad strives to associate himself with certain
"ideological programs," namely pan-Arabism, and, to a lesser
extent, Baathism. Asad also endeavors to cultivate the
perception that his fidelity to certain core concerns or
"sacred obligations " --achieving the return of the Golan
Heights, and securing a homeland for the Palest inians--is
above reproach. How each of these is inextricably tied to his
contest with Israel will be addressed in due course. What
matters here is understanding that Asad hopes to create a
situation within Syria where inducing compliance "only on the
basis of fear" is ultimately unnecessary.
A discussion of legitimacy would be incomplete without
incorporating certain relevant observations made by Max Weber.
In The Theory of Economic and Social Organization, Weber
describes the possible motives for attributing legitimacy to
any given "order."
The legitimacy of an order may be guaranteed or upheld in
two principal ways: (1) from purely disinterested
motives, which may be (a) purely affectual, consisting in
an emotionally determined loyalty; or (b) may derive from
a rational belief in the absolute validity of the order as
an expression of ultimate values, whether they be moral,
esthetic or of any other type; or (c) may originate in
religious attitudes, through the belief in the dependence
of some condition of religious salvation on conformity
with the order; (2) also or entirely by self-interest,
that is, through expectations of specific ulterior
consequences, but consequences which are, to be sure, of
a particular kind. [Ref. 6]
Not all of these means of inspiring legitimacy are available
to Asad. It will become clear in these pages that Asad does
not possess the affectual attributes necessary to engender
legitimacy, nor can he rely upon religious attitudes for this
purpose. In fact, Syria's religious milieu makes Asad's
legitimacy-building task all the more difficult. Asad, then,
must instead motivate the Syrian people to accept his regime
either for reasons of self-interest, or because his regime is
perceived to be an "expression of ultimate values." The
ultimate "value" that Asad has chosen to promote is his
regime's unrelenting opposition to Israel.
Besides motives for attributing legitimacy to an order,
Weber has also identified three "types" of legitimacy:
traditional, charismatic, and legal rational. It would be
impossible to conceive of "traditional" legitimacy in Syria
simply because--like many third-world countries--it is too
young to have had an opportunity to create the institutions
and symbols necessary to create political traditions.
Charismatic legitimacy is similarly difficult to imagine, but
only because Asad himself is not endowed with the personal
qualities required to create it. This will be discussed in
further detail later. A legal-rational foundation for
legitimacy is also not applicable for Syria under Asad; Asad's
ascendancy to office was not based upon legal procedures.
Like those before him, Asad seized power. As far as the
exercise of political authority is concerned, Asad may cloak
his decisions and directives in so-called "legal" procedures
and institutions, but this does not disguise the fact that he
is anything other than a dictator. The law is at Asad's
disposal, and is therefore ultimately irrelevant. In this
respect, Weber's analysis fails to satisfy those observers of
Syrian politics who seek a precise definition of legitimacy.
In the specific context of Syrian politics under Asad,
legitimacy is best defined by describing how it is realized:
Syria's political leadership achieves legitimacy by
demonstrating a minimum level of fidelity to those concerns
which weigh most heavily upon the collective psyche of Syria's
citizenry. These "concerns" can be variously described as
prevailing moral principles (Easton) , highly valued goals
pertaining to sacred obligations (Hudson) , or an expression of
ultimate values (Weber). Asad's government is legitimate in
the eyes of Syria's citizens when its decisions regarding
these concerns are accepted as proper. It will become evident
in the course of this essay that the primary concern of
Syria's people is their confrontation with Israel. All other
concerns--even economic--are subordinate to the contest with
the Jewish state.
Asad's search for legitimacy, as it has been described, is
of utmost importance. "While the stability of an order may be
maintained for a time through fear or expediency or custom,
the optimal or most harmonious relationship between the ruler
and the ruled is that in which the ruled accept the rightness
of the ruler's superior power." [Ref. 7] Like all political
leaders, Asad has an agenda of goals and objectives. He
realizes that these aspirations are better served if the
Syrian people "harmoniously" accept him as their leader. At
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the top of this agenda is his own political survival. Asad
seeks to retain his position as Syria's president
indefinitely. Thus, Asad's quest for legitimacy is really a
quest for longevity.
Asad finds himself handicapped, however, in his search for
legitimacy. His handicap is one he ignores only at his own
peril, for it invites the bitter animosity of most Syrians.
That Asad has maintained his position in spite of this
handicap is remarkable testimony to his political acumen.
This handicap is his Alawi heritage.
II. ASAD'S ALAWI ANCESTRY- -IMPEDIMENT TO LEGITIMACY
"Most Syrians share a common culture, religion, and
language, and yet Syria is plagued by a lack of homogeneity."
[Ref. 8] The resentment directed at the Alawi minority is
perhaps the best illustration of the divisive nature of Syrian
society. Because Asad is an Alawi, the political implications
of this widespread umbrage are profound. "Indeed, he [Asad]
has spent much of his adult life trying to escape from
identification with his minority background, but the fact that
his regime is still widely seen in these terms suggests he has
been less than successful" [Ref. 9] That lack of success
makes his drive for legitimacy on alternative levels all the
more imperative.
An examination of the Alawi minority is necessary to
depict the gulf which separates Asad from the greater part of
the Syrian population. This depiction will further generate
a greater understanding of the monumental task which confronts
Asad in his pursuit of legitimacy, as well as highlight the
specific obstacles which stand in his path.
Anti-Alawi sentiments are not a recent phenomenon in
Syria, nor are they a direct by-product of Asad's political
position. Although Asad's presidency has certainly
exacerbated anti-Alawi animosities, these sentiments have for
a long time been entrenched in Syrian culture. Approximately
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one million Alawis currently reside within Syria. The largest
of Syria's minorities, they comprise 12 percent of the total
population. The precise origin of the Alawi tribes is
uncertain; most anthropologists agree that certain elements
constitute what was left over from an ancient Canaanite people
who cherished their insular existence in the mountains of
Syria. But according to the Alawis themselves, their lineage
can be traced to the ancient tribes of Arabia. Fleeing
persecution, their ancestors found temporary refuge in the
Jabal Sinjar, a mountainous area between the Tigris and
Euphrates in modern-day Iraq, before ultimately relocating to
the mountains of Western Syria several hundred years ago. In
present-day Syria, Sunni Muslims, who constitute a majority of
roughly 70 percent, live scattered throughout the country,
whereas the Alawis congregate in particular areas, forming
local majorities. Most Alawis continue to reside in the Jabal
al Nusayriyah--a mountain range which hugs the Mediterranean
coastline in the northwest province of Latakia.
Despite this remote location, contacts with the Byzantines
and the crusaders left an indelible imprint on the Alawi
practice of Islam. In fact, most Sunni Muslims insist that
the Alawis are not Muslims at all.
Elements of Alawite beliefs, such as the transmigration of
souls, the divinity of Ali, and a trinity put Alawis on
the fringes of Islam. These practices and beliefs have
provided the historic pretext for Sunni persecution of
Alawis in Syria and have distanced Alawis from less
heterodox Shia sects in Iraq and Iran. [Ref. 10]
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Most observers consider the Alawi practice of religion to be
more closely associated with Christianity. The Alawis
celebrate many Christian holy days including Christmas,
Easter, Pentecost, and Palm Sunday. Furthermore, Alawis honor
a number of Christian saints. In addition to their affinity
for Christian traditions, the Alawis reject many of the tenets
of Islam, including the Shari'a, sacred Islamic law.
Alawis ignore Islamic sanitary practices, dietary
restrictions, sexual mores, and religious rituals.
Likewise, they pay little attention to the fasting,
almsgiving, and pilgrimage ceremonies of Islam; indeed,
they consider the pilgrimage to Mecca a form of idol
worship. [Ref. 11]
Not surprisingly, Alawi religious practices long ago provoked
the wrath of neighboring Muslim populations. The resulting
persecution had the effect of making the central tenets of
Alawi belief a highly guarded secret. Reflecting this
furtiveness, Alawis have no public religious structures or
places of worship, and to this day only a select few Alawis
are fully indoctrinated into the faith. Hand-in-hand with
this persecution and secretiveness, the practice of taqiyah--
hiding one's religious beliefs to avoid suf f ering--has been
perpetuated. Because Sunni Muslims consider taqiyah a
cowardly tactic, its acknowledged practice only invites more
resentment and abuse.
Taqiyah has also allowed the Alawis a cer.tain flexibility.
Prior to the First World War the community was known as the
Nusayriyah, after its founder Muhammad ibn Nusayr, who in A.D.
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859 declared himself the "gateway to truth, " or bab, an
important figure in Shi'i theology. (Hence the Islamic
foundation for Alawi religious beliefs.) The Nusayris adopted
the appellation "Alawi" during the years of the French
mandate
.
The change in name- -imposed by the French upon their
seizure of control of Syria--has significance. Whereas
Nusayri emphasizes the group's differences from Islam,
Alawi suggests an adherent of 'Ali (the son-in-law of the
Prophet Muhammad) and accentuates the religion's
similarities to Shi'i Islam. Consequently, opponents of
the Asad regime habitually use the former term; supporters
of the regime use the latter. [Ref. 12]
French influence of the Alawi community would transcend
this simple name-change, and, in fact, still reverberates in
modern-day Syria. Besides dividing the country
geographically, the French cynically and intentionally
inflamed sectarian differences so as to consolidate their
control over the area. In doing so the French created the
Troupes Speciales du Levant, a local army comprised of
"reliable" minorities—Armenians, Circassions, and Alawis.
These minorities were unaccustomed to the privileges lavished
on them by the French, and quite understandably leaped at the
opportunity to improve their situation even--perhaps
especially— if it was at the expense of the dominant Sunni
majority. In due course, the Sunnis came to resent the
collusion of these minorities with the French overseers. Many
of these sentiments linger to this day. • Interestingly,
President Asad's grandfather, a local notable in the years of
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the Mandate, is known to have cooperated with the French, a
fact that has been carefully muted within Syria.
The domination of the present-day Syrian army by Alawi
officers is frequently credited to the toehold gained in the
Troupes Speciales by their forefathers under the French. This
supposition may oversimplify the situation. A more likely
explanation for the ubiquitous Alawi presence in today's
Syrian army is that the traditionally poor Alawis saw military
service as the best available means by which to improve their
otherwise squalid existence, while the Sunni majorities viewed
military service with contempt. Hanna Batatu, writing in
1981, supports this hypothesis:
The pre-independence character of the army, this is, its
character prior to 1946, cannot account for its 1963 or
its present composition, at least in any decisive sense.
The reason must be obvious. In 1963 Syria had standing
armed forces of about 65,000, and now has nearly a quarter
of a million men under arms, whereas the Syrian contingent
of the Troupes Speciales that it inherited from the French
in 1946 counted only 7,000, and was by 1948 reduced to
2,500 men, because the ruling landed and mercantile
families of the day regarded the contingent as too large
and too financially burdensome. . . At any rate, it is
clear that the strong foothold of the Alawis in the
Troupes Speciales cannot explain their present dominant
influence in the army. A more significant causal factor
that was at work as relentlessly in the postindependence
period as under the French was the depressed economic
condition of the Alawis. . . Also relevant as an
explanation for the superior numerical weight of the
Alawis, at least among the rank-and-file draftees, is the
matter of the badal ("financial substitute"). Prior to
1964 Syrians were permitted to buy exemption from military
service. . . [Ref. 13]
Despite these facts, there is- a widespread perception
among Syria's Sunnis that Asad's monopolization of power is an
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enduring by-product of Alawi complicity with the French during
the years of the mandate--and it is the perception which
matters most. This makes the yoke of Alawi domination--thus
linked to colonialism--that much more reprehensible. Asad,
the consummate politician, recognizes this liability.
Asad has systematically endeavoured to avoid an image of
his regime as being based on confessional-military
support, or a junta of Alawi army officers. He has sought
to bring legitimisation and consensus to his rule and to
project himself as a national-popular leader with the
interests of the Syrian people at heart." [Ref. 14]
Asad has tried to discourage sectarian affiliations by
secularization of Syrian government and society. His efforts
have not been wholly effective; many Sunnis have resisted
secularization, recognizing it as a means by which Asad
attempts to legitimize Alawi rule. Devout Muslims see
secularism as contrary to the precepts of Islam, while other
Sunnis cynically consider it a "convenient cover for the Alawi
monopolization of power." [Ref. 15] In addition, certain
developments have only served to highlight Alawi-Sunni
differences
:
Since coming to power, Asad had succeeded both in playing
down the sectarian character of his regime and in giving
it a more popular appeal, despite heavy reliance on the
army and security forces. The events of 1978-1982
reversed this process and reinforced the division between
the Sunnis and Alawis. The Sunnis will find it difficult
to forget the events of Hama . [Ref. 16]
Anti-regime disturbances of this sort are especially
problematic when one considers the composition of the officer
corps. "It is important to recognize the fact that although
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the officer corps of the army is heavily laden with Alawis,
the rank and file remains Sunni, which complicates the problem
of policing internal disorder that is at base anti-Alawi .
"
[Ref. 17]
Making matters worse for Asad is a willingness among some
Sunnis to embrace conspiracy theories which seem to confirm
Alawi maleficence. To wit: "Sunni rumors throughout the
Middle East attribute the loss of the Golan Heights to an
Alawi 'deal' with Israel involving a large sum of money in
exchange for the Heights." [Ref. 18]
This persistent anti-Alawi agitation has put Asad in the
awkward position of advocating secularization and
simultaneously advancing claims that Alawis are true Muslims.
[Asad] "has taken a number of steps to blur the Alawi-
Sunni distinction— changing the presidential oath,
spotlighting his participation in the activities of the
Syrian Islamic community, and encouraging Sunni uluma to
portray the Alawis as Shi ' a Muslims, a highly debatable
proposition." [Ref. 19]
Neither campaign has made Alawi leadership any more
palatable to the Sunni majority. Indeed, efforts to depict
the Alawis as Muslim may only further inflame Sunni
indignation
.
Asad has made use of other devices in his endeavor to
quiet the Sunni masses. In the aftermath of the 1973 war with
Israel, Asad publicly dismissed a number of Alawi soldiers who,
had failed to meet their battlefield obligations. The
appointment of Sunni and non-Alawi officers to important
16
positions likewise received generous publicity. Asad's
political machinations are complicated by the fact that the
potential exists for cleavage even within the Alawi community
itself, as evidenced by his willingness to openly humiliate
his fellow Alawis.
The Alawis may be divided geographically into two groups:
the Alawis of the mountains, and the Alawis of the plains.
More commonly, the Alawis are broken down into four main
tribal confederations. "Alawis today are not always
comfortable with the subject of tribal affiliations as the
Ba'thist state has striven to replace such categories with the
modern notion of citizenship, but if pressed every village boy
could tell you to which tribe his family belongs." [Ref. 20]
A more recent development has been economic stratification of
the Alawis.
Since their rise to power, an upper class has been
differentiating itself from the rest of the community and,
within the ranks of this class, even a group of
millionaires, waxing rich from fat commissions on state
contracts, has reared its head. This may under certain
circumstances weaken the attachment to the regime of the
least favored segments of the sect. Significantly enough,
in 1969 when Alawi peasants launched a rising in the Ghab
district over debts owed to the Agricultural Bank, the
Alawi rulers did not sympathize with them but put them
down by force. [Ref. 21]
The fact that rivalries exist within the Alawi community
has led some to speculate that perhaps Asad is most vulnerable
to a cabal of disenchanted Alawi officers. This seems an
unlikely scenario. Despite any differences which might exist,
17
most Alawis have a stake in maintaining the status quo; an
attempt to overthrow the guardian Asad might be suicidal
.
The Alawis are not about to attempt such folly, let alone
permit it to happen, for it might set in motion a chain of
events that could eventuate in the loss of Alawi dominance
in the power structure, a development dreaded by almost
every Alawi. Thus, for now and the immediate future,
there appears to be an overriding cohesion among Alawis
based on fear of the consequences that might ensue for
them should the existing Alawi regime be overthrown. [Ref .
22]
Internecine quarrels notwithstanding, the Alawis can be
expected to submerge their differences for the sake of Asad's
regime
.
In summary, Asad's Alawi heritage makes his quest for
legitimacy an unrelenting challenge. Several factors
overwhelm Asad's best efforts to confront the problem. First,
the Alawis have suffered pariah status in the Muslim world
throughout their history; anti-Alawi sentiments have endured
for centuries. Second, Sunni Muslims contemptuously see Alawi
religious practices as a heterodox form of Islam--at best.
Third, Sunni Muslims have not forgotten Alawi complicity with
the French during the years of the mandate. Fourth, it is
widely--and correctly—perceived that the Alawis are
disproportionately represented at all levels of government.
If there is any doubt that Asad's Alawi background is a
liability, then it should be dispelled for two reasons.
First, Asad's concern is reflected in his efforts to address
the problem, as evidenced by his strident attempts to portray
the Alawis as genuine Muslims, and by his willingness to
18
sacrifice "disposable" Alawis. Second, the Alawis sense their
own vulnerability, which is revealed by the priority placed on
group cohesion despite intra-Alawi differences.
That Asad has ruled for over two decades implies that he
has had some success in overcoming the formidable obstacle of
his Alawi heritage. The question which naturally follows is:
How, precisely, has he managed to do this, assuming as we
have, that brute force alone is not sufficient or desirable?
The evidence suggests that Asad has used a number of vehicles,
each with varying degrees of success. Each of these vehicles-
-or "tools" for legitimacy-building--may be grouped into one
of three categories: institutions, ideas, or ambitions. The
task at hand is to examine each of these tools and determine
whether or not it has contributed to Asad's staying-power. In
those instances where a tool has been used with some efficacy,
the specific feature which makes that tool valuable must be
identified.
19
III. TOOLS FOR LEGITIMACY-BUILDING
A. THE BAATH PARTY
Political parties might serve any number of purposes, but
a party's precise responsibilities are dependent upon the
context in which it operates. Traditionally, party functions
include interest aggregation, mass mobilization, and political
socialization. As far as these matters are concerned, the
Baath party is no exception. It is, however, unique. In
addition to these functions, evidence suggests the Asad has
tried to use the Baath party to sanction the legitimacy of his
regime. As such, the Baath is correctly categorized as an
institutional vehicle of legitimization.
The situation is ironic since certain characteristics of
the Baath party make it an unlikely candidate for this role.
Unfortunately for Asad, he fails to understand that the
party's legacy makes the Baath a poor choice for the purpose
of building legitimacy.
First of all, the Baath began not as a political party,
but more correctly as an opposition movement. In fact, one of
the party's founders, Michel Aflaq, originally conceived of
the Baath as a skeptic of the government, rather than an
advocate for it.
Aflaq saw his movement as a critique of government, closer
to the people than to any regime. Indeed, it was a
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dispute over the nature and role of the party that, after
the 1963 revolution, set Aflaq against the young officers
of the clandestine Military Committee founded by Salah
Jadid, Hafez al-Asad, and others in Cairo during the life
of the United Arab Republic. Aflaq wanted to preserve the
party's watchdog role over government, whereas they wanted
it to be an instrument of government. [Ref . 23]
Part of the Baath's original appeal can be credited to its
attractiveness as an opposition movement. Obviously, any
political support it enjoyed as such was not wholly
transferable once it became a government cheerleader.
Furthermore, the Baath, for all its success as an
opposition movement, was precisely that: an opposition
movement. Consequently, it inevitably and quite naturally
alienated the people against whom it was positioned. At the
most fundamental level, the Baath agenda forced a showdown
between urban and rural interests. "In the 1960s, the Ba ' th
became a vehicle of rural revolt against the city, pursuing
land reform and socialist policies challenging the hold of the
city over the economy and the village." [Ref. 24] The Baath
was not a populist or mass-based party, but an ideological
one. Though it promoted more widely popular ideas such as
pan-Arabism, its embrace of socialism threatened the interests
of the landed elite while appealing to the nascent rural
elite, thus pitting one against the other.
During the 1940s and 1950s, the Baath message of pan-
Arabism appealed to many levels of Syrian society, but its
socialist or social justice message was most attractive to
those who believed that they were not receiving a fair
share of the state's resources. In Syria, a state that
lacked an industrial proletariat of any size, that meant
rural people. [Ref. 25]
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Ultimately, the Baath can credit its success to the urban-
rural strife it engendered.
"Essentially, the rise of the Ba'thists and the fall of
the old regime were a product of two dovetailing
developments: a conflict of lord and peasant, and the
rise of a salaried new middle class challenging the
landlord." [Ref. 26]
Asad recognized the divisive nature of the Baath' s rise to
power, and eventually sought to repair some of the damage that
was done. "This policy of class struggle deliberately
polarized society. In the aftermath of the 1967 war, however,
Syria could no longer afford internal conflict and a wing of
the Ba'thist Party under General Hafiz al-Asad demanded an end
to this strategy in favor of its opposite: national unity."
[Ref. 27] Asad thus foreshadowed a strategy he would pursue
later as president. But his efforts to reconcile the Baath to
those Syrians damaged by its success, and accordingly
strengthen the party's legitimizing powers, have been futile.
If one is not persuaded that the urban population was so
disaffected with Baath ascendancy that the party forfeited its
ability to act as an effective legitimizing agent, then one
should be reminded that these same urbanites eagerly supported
the uprising of the Muslim Brethren in the late 1970s and
early 1980s.
The core support [of political Islam] is concentrated in
the traditional urban quarters among merchants, artisans,
and the laboring elements under their influence. . . This
part of Syrian society, from large notable to small
trader, paid the heaviest costs of Ba ' th policies in the
sixties. Moreover, having failed to establish political
institutions capable of absorbing broad participatory
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demands, the Ba'th cannot win the unchallenged legitimacy
needed to deprive Islamic counterelites of their mass
support. [Ref. 28]
That these urban populations would support the Muslim Brethren
even though they had little affinity for the Brethren's
Islamic zeal is further testimony to their long-lasting
bitterness. The urban populations supported the Brethren
simply because they were the most effective means by which to
confront their nemesis: Asad and his Baath cronies.
The confrontation with the Muslim Brethren also serves to
highlight another factor which inhibits the Baath from serving
as an effective legitimizing agent: "One characteristic of
the Baath party that has led to problems in Syria is its
secular nature. There has been an attempt by the party to
separate church and state." [Ref. 29] The Syrian constitution
which was written under the aegis of the Baath party in 1973
does not recognize Islam as the state religion. Although the
Baath party leadership certainly recognizes the importance of
Islam in the lives of most Syrian citizens, party advocacy of
secularization is not unrelated to the fact that Baath
ideology is the brain-child of a Syrian Christian, Michel
Aflaq. "It is true that Islam has an important place in
Ba'thist thought--not , however, because of the truth of
Islam's social and religious teachings, but because it is a
vital constitutive element in Arab nationalist consciousness.
"
[Ref. 30] But the very fact that Baath ideology fails to
appreciate Islam's social and religious teachings is what
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makes the Baath repugnant to a certain sector of the Syrian
population. Cynical manipulation of Islamic values has not
alleviated Baathist shortcomings, only exacerbated them.
Although these characteristics of the Baath party would
predispose one to dismiss it as a viable legitimizing agent,
there is reason to believe that Asad has nevertheless tried to
use it in this manner, and not without some success. Asad
first foreshadowed his willingness to compromise strident
Baath ideology for other purposes in the 1960s.
Intra-Baath politics in Syria settled into a contest
between two factions. That led by Salah Jadid espoused a
doctrinaire socialist system domestically and support
externally for a Palestinian war of national liberation
against Israel. Jadid had resigned his post as army chief
of staff in 1965 and directed the Baath regional party
bureaucracy with the aid of many like-minded civilians.
His challenger was Hafiz al-Asad, who was more concerned
with results than with doctrine in domestic affairs. [Ref
.
31]
Asad realized that a Baath party which clung tenaciously
to dogmatic socialism stood little chance of effectively
mobilizing the sentiments necessary to legitimize his rule.
Consequently, soon after taking power, Asad "inaugurated a
wide-ranging. policy of 'rectification' {tashih) [sic] in order
to broaden his regime's legitimacy. His policies included a
retreat from the radical socialism of earlier regimes by
introducing economic liberalization to attract the support of
the urban Sunni entrepreneurial classes." [Ref. 32]
Complementing this liberalization, Asad used the Baath
party to establish a system of local government, an "Asad
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innovation." It appears to have been a genuine attempt to
link the party more closely to the people. "Before him [Asad]
there was no local government to speak of, and everything,
however trivial, had to be decided at the center. Beginning
in 1972, a system of local government was introduced, which
has been considerably refined since then, and which is
probably the most nearly democratic of Syria's institutions."
[Ref. 33]
Baath involvement in legitimizing institutions is not
limited to local government. Every four years the Baath
convenes a regional congress. Altogether, 770 elected
delegates, representing every division of the party, meet for
as long as two weeks to discuss government -related matters.
These regional congresses appear to serve as a kind of "safety
valve." "By all accounts, these congresses are the prime
occasion for rising Young Turks in the party to challenge
their elders--but not of course the president--in a robust
atmosphere of 'party democracy.'" [Ref. 34] These regional
congresses also serve socializing and feedback functions. Not
only is it the responsibility of the attending delegates to
explain and justify the regime's policies to the public, but
party leaders also depend on the delegates for "local
knowledge of conditions and attitudes." [Ref. 35]
To further expand opportunities for Syrians to participate
in the government and Baath party politics, Asad created the
173-seat People's Assembly in 1971. The original members were
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nominated, but after 1973 representatives were "elected." Its
purpose is to function as a forum to which government
ministers will be accountable. The Baath party dominates this
institution, but other political parties are allowed to
participate
.
Over the years the assembly was generally considered
little more than a rubber stamp until, with presidential
encouragement, it surprised everyone in the fall of 1987
by directing sharp criticism at three ministers and
withdrawing its confidence from them. As a result, the
government of Dr. 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Kasm was brought down
after seven years in office. [Ref. 36]
This development notwithstanding, the People's Assembly can
hardly be considered a democratic institution, though Asad
certainly wishes the Syrian people to see it as such.
Other institutional arrangements reveal Asad's desire to
use the Baath to legitimize his regime. The party boasts both
a National Command, the supposed government of the future Arab
nation, and a Regional Command, which is charged with all
party activity within Syria. The National Command is
comprised of twenty-one members--half of them Syrian, and the
other half coming from other Arab states. On the other hand,
the highest-ranking members of Asad's cabinet comprise the
Regional Command. Naturally, Asad leads both Commands.
Presumably, the National Command sits at the apex of the Baath
party structure, and the Regional Command is subordinate to
it. This, however, is not the reality. Asad understands that
there is little chance that a united Arab nation will come
into being. As a result, the National Command is a relatively
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impotent body which lacks any real influence. More
importantly, Asad realizes that the National Command does
little, if anything at all, to strengthen his regime.
The Regional Command, however, is another story
altogether. Beneath the Regional Command sits the Central
Committee and nineteen branch commands which are responsible
for directing party activity at local levels. Within the
military, the Regional Command oversees a party structure
which permeates the army even at the battalion level. "This
type of organization and party discipline has made the Ba ' th
the primary tool of political socialization and stability in
Syria since Asad's ascent to power." [Ref. 37]
The final institution related to Baath party politics is
the National Progressive Front. Its existence is a token
gesture toward permitting political pluralism. The National
Progressive Front is a coalition of left-leaning parties
including the Baath, which, not surprisingly, is the dominant
member. Officially, then, Syria is not a single-party state.
By permitting other political parties to exist, Asad may claim
a greater measure of legitimacy for the Baath party, and thus
for himself. At best these are pretentious maneuvers. "Even
accredited members of the National Progressive Front are not
allowed to recruit followers in the army or at the university,
both of which are exclusive preserves of the Ba'th. Nor do
they have nationwide organizations to compare with that of the
Ba'th." [Ref. 38]
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What these various establishments reflect is Asad's
conviction that he can add to his regime's legitimacy and
longevity through the Baath party and its accompanying
institutions
.
He [Asad] wants people to believe in his institutions:
the popular organizations, the people's assembly, the
National Progressive Front, the local government bodies
and above all, the legitimacy of his own election to the
presidency for three seven-year terms [now four] . The
backbone of the system is the party--the civilian party to
mobilize, indoctrinate, and control the population, and
the party in the army as the cure for the old malady of
factionalism in the officer corps, in Asad's view the only
real guarantee that Syria will not again fall prey to
coups d'etat. . . [Ref. 39]
Has Asad been correct in assuming that these Baath party
arrangements have added to the legitimacy of his regime?
Certainly there were pockets of support in Syrian society
which welcomed the access these institutions created. "Asad's
program of political and economic liberalization was well
received. By expanding the Ba'th's societal base and
establishing a popularly elected People's Assembly, Asad was
able to stabilize Syrian political life to a significant
degree." [Ref. 40] Patrick Seale goes one step further,
claiming that Baath party loyalties made a critical difference
in the events which culminated with the Hama revolt
.
A visitor to Syria in the early 1980s, for example, could
not deny the fervor the party inspired when Ba'thists in
arms were risking their lives in the struggle against the
Islamic underground. One got the sense that they
considered the state to be theirs and were ready to defend
it. Indeed, had the party not been strong and its members
not committed, it is doubtful whether the regime would
have survived that ordeal. Asad won the contest, in Hama,
Aleppo, and elsewhere, not only because he used force and
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great brutality to crush the uprising, but because the
party stood firm. [Ref. 41]
The events at Hama will receive greater attention later. For
purposes here, suffice it to say that had Asad's ambitions for
the Baath party been realized--that is, had it adequately
performed its legitimizing function--the events at Hama and
Aleppo would never have occurred. The mere fact that the
uprising transpired casts serious doubt on the party's ability
to legitimize Asad's rule. It should also be remembered that
the Alawis permeate all government institutions— including the
Baath party. How many of those "dedicated party workers" and
"inspired Ba'thists in arms" Seale describes were Alawis who
not only stood to gain so much social advancement via
participation in the Baath party, but simultaneously stood to
lose so much if Asad were removed from power?
There are other reasons to question the Baath party's
utility as a legitimizing agent. Party membership has grown
at an impressive rate under Asad. It is not clear, however,
that this explosion in party membership reflects any real
affinity for Baath ideals. "Membership in the Ba'th has
virtually become a qualification for high office as well as a
means of getting ahead more quickly. Consequently, the party
has attracted its fair share of opportunists who care little
about its original socialist and reformist goals." [Ref. 42]
Seale himself admits: "Any ambitious man in Syria today would
be ill-advised not to join it." [Ref. 43] John Devlin notes
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that disingenuous enrollment in the Baath is a problem not
confined to Syria, while also making the more important point
that people sometimes feel compelled to join simply to avoid
unwelcome government scrutiny:
Under the authoritarian rule of the past two decades, the
Syrian and Iraqi Baath organizations have grown
enormously. As of the mid-1980s, the parties have 100,000
full members and 400,000 candidates in Syria. Over the
same period, however, vitality has drained out of each.
People join for party benefits-- jobs , access to places in
the university--or merely to avoid suspicion of
disloyalty. [Ref. 44]
Furthermore, while the Baath party and its companion
institutions have offered superficial opportunities to
increase mass political participation, a substantial portion
of the population cannot overcome their cynicism to take
advantage of these "opportunities" unless more profoundly
motivated to do so. "The turnout at elections was generally
low until citizens were required, in dealing with government
departments, to produce proof of having voted." [Ref. 45]
Finally, the absence of Baath ideological zeal in the conduct
of Syrian foreign policy exposes Asad's use of Baath rhetoric
for what it is: a useful domestic tool. " [Asad] uses Baath
rhetoric but deals externally through the Arab League, other
regional groupings, or bilaterally." [Ref. 46] Indeed, the
most recent gathering of the Damascus-based National (pan-
Arab) Congress took place long-ago in 1980.
To conclude, the Baath party does not and has not served
as an effective legitimizing agent for the regime of Hafez al-
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Asad, despite his best efforts to take advantage of it as
such. The early history of the Baath has rendered it useless
as an institutional vehicle of legitimacy. In its formative
years the Baath was an opposition movement, and it proved
itself more adept as a revolutionary organization than as a
traditional political party. As an opposition movement, the
Baath fed off of urban-rural conflict and forever alienated a
significant portion of Syrian city-dwellers. Furthermore, the
Baath has never been a mass-based party; instead, it was an
ideological one, and its ideological underpinnings--even when
tempered by Asad's "corrective movement " --make it unappealing
to too many Syrians. Likewise, the Baath' s promotion of
secularization angers devout Muslims. Finally, the Baath and
its companion institutions have not engendered any real
enthusiasm for mass participation; as a result, many Syrian
citizens appear motivated to seek Baath party membership only
for personal gain.
Luckily for Asad, the Baath party has not been the only
means at his disposal to build the legitimacy of his regime.
Coincidentally , an idea espoused by the Baath has also been
utilized by for these same purposes. That idea is pan-
Arabism.
B. PAN-ARABISM
As a tool for legitimacy-building, pan-Arabism has proven
more useful than the Baath party. This does not, however,
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necessarily mean that its usefulness eclipses that of
Israel's. In fact, it is the onerous presence of Israel in
the Arab world which makes pan-Arabism available as a
legitimizing agent to Hafez al-Asad. Without Israel, it is
difficult to imagine pan-Arabism as a useful instrument to
Asad's regime.
Ironically, pan-Arabism, like the Baath party, can credit
its emergence in the Arab world as an opposition movement.
Arab nationalism arose as an opposition movement around
1900 and accelerated after 1908, once the Ottoman
Committee of Union and Progress began to enforce
administrative centralization, streamline the provincial
bureaucracy, and install Turks in a number of critical
posts. A growing number of Syrian notables lost their
positions in the Ottoman system, and it was they who first
turned the idea of Arabism into a vehicle for expressing
their grievances with Istanbul and for regaining their
positions. [Ref. 47]
Unlike the Baath, however, pan-Arabism does not suffer from
those characteristics which rob it of utility as a
legitimizing agent. Pan-Arabism, as an opposition movement,
distinguishes itself from the Baath because it pits the Arab
people collectively against an external foe, rather than
dividing the Arabs into competing factions. In the early part
of this century, that foe was the Turks; today the Turks have
been replaced by the West. Israel, in turn, is the most
onerous manifestation of the West.
The earliest forms of pan-Arabism were particularly
attractive to Syrians for two reasons. First, just as pan-
Arabism is a useful device for Asad in modern-day Syria, it
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likewise proved valuable to the political elites in the final
days of the Ottoman empire:
The point to underscore is that by World War I, Arabism
had become the ascendant idea and movement of the times in
Syria. During the war, when many notables began to jump
from the sinking Ottoman ship, they grabbed, as they fell,
the rope of Arab nationalism. They really had no other
choice. It was this rope that enabled them to swing into
the interwar years with their political and social
influence intact. [Ref. 48]
Second, pan-Arabism derived its appeal to the Syrian people as
a means by which to express frustration with colonialism as
experienced under the French mandate. Syrians were enraged
with the French dismemberment of their country.
France ceded to Turkey Syria's northern wheatlands, two of
its oldest cities, and the northern hill country.
Lebanon, which had been merely a Christian district, was
enlarged at Syria's expense to include all the Muslim
areas it could reasonably dominate. . .These moves also
left Syria with a bitterness toward the West that has yet
to run its full course. . .Young Syrian intellectuals,
embittered by the circumstances of independence and with
loyalties to a much larger geographic entity, sought
identity and direction in the idea of pan-Arabism. [Ref.
49]
It is little wonder that pan-Arabism continues to play such a
significant role in the Syrian psyche when one considers the
corresponding parallels to Israel. Most Syrians adamantly
believe that Palestine is part of "Greater Syria, " and that an
aggressively imperialist Israel has not only stolen Palestine,
but the Golan Heights as well. Consequently, Israel has
inherited the wrath once directed at France, thus perpetuating
the pan-Arab movement in Syria. Just as it did years ago,
pan-Arabism unites Syrians against an external enemy.
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Pan-Arabism distinguishes itself from the Baath party as
a legitimizing agent in another substantive way. As noted
earlier, the Baath party has ceased to be a serious foreign
policy asset for Asad; it is useful exclusively as a domestic
device. Pan-Arabism, on the other hand, derives its worth as
a domestic device by the strength it gives Syria in the
international arena: "Whatever one calls it, Syria's strategy
in the area flows from the assumption that Syria is the
'beating heart' of Arab nationalism and therefore has the
right and obligation to play a central, pivotal role in the
region." [Ref. 50] Without question, this appears to be a
well-founded assumption. One of Syria's strengths is "a
tradition of intellectual leadership in the Arab world that
has given Syria disproportionate influence over the ideas and
sentiments of a broad Arab constituency." [Ref. 51]
Accordingly, pan-Arabism provides justification for Syria to
meddle in the affairs of other Arab states. "Interference in
the internal affairs of other Arab states is considered
appropriate in order to further coordination among the various
regions in the Arab nation: 'No Arab region can improve its
condition in isolation from the other regions.'" [Ref. 52]
Lebanon is, of course, vivid testimony to this reality.
Interestingly, pan-Arabism and the conflict with Israel seem
inextricably linked in Syria: "Syria's main assets in the
inter-Arab arena are its self-appointed status as guardian of
Arab interests, its position as the main confrontation state
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against Israel, and its obstructive power." [Ref. 53] This is
no mere coincidence. Pan-Arabism would lose whatever potency
it enjoys without an external target, in this case Israel.
Pan-Arabism potentially serves a legitimizing function on
a more discreet, subliminal level as well. It is conceivable
that Asad has tried to use pan-Arabism to create something
which Syria lacks--a national identity. There is little point
in belaboring the fractured nature of Syrian society. Alawi-
Sunni differences have already been described in detail.
Suffice it to say that many more ethnic and religious
cleavages exist within the artificial construct that is Syria.
Syria's heterogeneous character is the inevitable result of
its geographic position; as a crossroads between continents
for competing empires, Syria has a long history of occupation
by foreigners. As some populations were displaced and others
settled, Syria became the mix of peoples it is today. The
legacy for Syria is country where too few citizens identify
themselves as "Syrian." "Sharp distinctions among the desert,
the village, and the city, and differences among the peoples
and the ideas that come from them, have always worked against
the kind of cohesion necessary for Syria's political integrity
and military defense." [Ref. 54] Moshe Ma'oz, respected
Israeli scholar of Syrian affairs, more succinctly describes
the situation: "The patriotism of the Syrian is confined to
the four walls of his own house; anything beyond them does not
concern him." [Ref. 55]
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It seems improbable that a leader as astute as Asad would
actually believe that pan-Arabism could help Syrians forge a
national identity. By definition pan-Arabism seeks to
transcend attachments to a nation-state in favor of a more
universal body--the entire Arab world. More likely, Asad
realized that fanning the flames of pan-Arabism contributed to
the steadiness of his regime. By emphasizing the anti-Israeli
side of the pan-Arab message, Asad could persuade Syrians of
various religious and ethnic persuasions to set aside their
differences. Even before Asad came to power, it had become
evident to careful observers of Syrian politics--and this, no
doubt, would include Asad himself --that Pan-Arab "ideas were
sufficiently powerful to usher in greater stability in Syria,
but they discouraged a specifically Syrian national identity."
[Ref. 56]
It is impossible to know whether Asad genuinely embraces
pan-Arab ideals. It can be said with greater certainty,
however, that Asad has deliberately manipulated the pan-Arab
message for the benefit of his regime. According to Ma'oz,
the Syrian "mass media and the national educational system
have been mobilised to stress constantly the importance of the
unity of the Arab-Syrian nation behind the leader-president,
Hafez al-Assad." [Ref. 57] Other followers of Syrian politics
insist that the pan-Arab message rings hollow in Syria; "The
idealism of the post -independence era has clearly waned. . .
Recent Syrian leaders have approached the notion of Arab unity
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cynically for short-term gains, not out of conviction." [Ref.
58] Any arguments contrary to this notion are difficult to
reconcile with Asad's decision to side with Iran during its
war with Iraq. If Asad placed any priority on the pan-Arab
principles he publicly espouses and promotes, he would not
have elected to betray the rest of the Arab world (Libya
excepted) , which sided with Iraq.
Asad's hypocrisy during the eight-year war unmasked the
real reason he so frequently preaches the virtues of pan-
Arabism: Asad considers Syria's pan-Arabism an effective
vehicle for mobilizing regime support by rallying the Syrian
public to his side in its contest with Israel.
As testimony to this fact, when Syria's pan-Arab message
is delivered, it frequently contains a heavy dose of anti-
Israeli sentiments. The following example, extracted from a
government newspaper, is illustrative:
Syria, with this [pan-Arab] stance, attracts all those
Arabs who believe in the need to liberate occupied Arab
territory and who have the will to work on behalf of
liberation no matter what the sacrifice or how high the
cost. Equally, Syria represents, through its stance and
pan-Arab principles, the true adversary against the
imperialist and Zionist reality, with all that their plots
encompass. Therefore, it was said of Damascus that it is
the future of the Arabs, and no Arab can assume a hostile
stance against Syria, unless he is opposed to the
liberation and against the pan-Arab future. [Ref. 59]
Several observations about this statement are worth making.
First, and most importantly, pan-Arabism is linked to
confronting the Israeli threat. Second, the statement depicts
Syrian leadership as essential if the contest with Israel is
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to be won. The reader is thus led to conclude that fidelity
to Syria is the yardstick by which loyalty to pan-Arab ideals
is measured; to oppose Syria is to support "Zionist plots."
Finally, no limit is set on the sacrifice that must be made by
those truly devoted to defeating Israel. As a result,
economic privation and repressive government measures may be
justified for the sake of the battle with Israel.
The following government statement more closely relates
pan-Arabism to Asad who, it is implied, is unrelenting in his
efforts to defeat Israel.
As regards foreign policy, Syria's position has been
characterized as principled, firm, and fully committed to
the Arab nation's higher pan-Arab interests. Thus, we
have seen the liberation war of 1973, and the victory
scored by our people under the leadership of struggler
President Hafiz al-Asad by restoring self-confidence and
the ability to face up to the Israeli challenge as well.
[Ref. 60]
Syrian intransigence in peace developments is also described
as necessary if allegiance to pan-Arab principles is to be
maintained.
We are making progress on all levels and in all areas,
struggling on behalf of liberating the occupied territory
and regaining our usurped rights. Syria, in the words of
our leader Hafiz al-Asad, is neither frightened nor
afraid. Syria is a country that holds fast to its pan-
Arab principles. No one will forcibly drag us into
positions that are incompatible with what we want . This
is what our leader has stressed, and this is what in fact
we shall do. [Ref. 61]
These statements contain motifs so frequently used by the
government media that they might more accurately be labelled
political mantras of the Asad regime.
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As regards the fundamental argument of this essay, the
effectiveness of pan-Arabism as a legitimizing agent is
ultimately irrelevant. Even if it should be the case that
pan-Arabism works to Asad's advantage by perpetuating his
regime, Syria's articulation of its pan-Arab principles is
clearly dependent upon anti-Israeli themes. Although pan-
Arabism was born before it came into existence, the state of
Israel has given Asad an opportunity to sustain the
articulation of pan-Arab principles for the sake of his
regime's survival. Were it not for Israel, Arab nationalism
would be of little use to Asad's government; indeed, were it
not for the West, Arab nationalism might very well disappear
completely from Syria's political lexicon.
Pan-Arabism is not the only legitimizing agent dependent
upon the perceived evil of Israel. Asad similarly manipulates
the Palestinian cause for the purpose of building his regime's
legitimacy
.
C. THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE
There is little doubt that Asad uses the Palestinian
cause, in some measure, to engender support for his regime.
But this does not mean that he uses it ef f ectively--on many
occasions Asad has acted contrary to Palestinian interests.
And even if Asad had not conducted himself so, it would not
necessarily follow that the Palestinian cause is or could be
a primary legitimizing resource for Asad. Moreover, any
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utility the Palestinian cause has as a legitimizing agent,
like pan-Arabism, derives its strength via the contest with
Israel. In the final analysis, however, there are peripheral
concerns Asad has vis-a-vis the Palestinians which eclipse his
interest--if not his ability--to manipulate the cause for
purposes of legitimacy-building.
Asad must appear faithful to Palestinian ambitions for two
reasons. First, Palestinian refugees residing within Syria,
despite their small numbers, represent a potentially
disruptive element. Second, recovery of a Palestinian home is
part and parcel of both pan-Arabism and the notion of Greater
Syria. Specifically, in Asad's quest for the return of the
Golan Heights, Syria "must seek parallel moves on the
Palestinian front, if only to avoid charges of betrayal that
it hurled at Anwar Sadat in the 1970s". [Ref. 62] On the
other hand, Asad chooses to use the Palestinian cause for a
number of reasons which subordinate the importance of its
legitimizing function. First, beating the drums of the
Palestinian cause is a source of both money and international
esteem. Second, various government-sponsored Palestinian
bodies--most notably al-Sa ' iqa--provide instruments by which
Asad may influence Arab politics. Third, Asad sees the
recovery of the Golan Heights, his most important goal after
regime survival, as inextricably linked to creation of a
homeland for the Palestinians; that is, Asad fears that
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progress towards a mini-state on the West Bank will jeopardize
Syria's chances of ever recovering the Golan.
Asad's devotion to the Palestinian cause is predominately-
-if not entirely—motivated for reasons of self-interest.
Foremost among Asad's concerns is the latent threat posed to
his regime's security by the Palestinian community. Failure
to support Palestinian interests might inspire collusion
between the Palestinians and the Muslim Brotherhood. "The
regime has been aware that a volatile Palestinian minority
could resort to violence against Syrian officials or have a
catalytic effect on the predominately Sunni opposition." [Ref .
63] To thwart such a possibility, Asad has continued a policy
of integration established soon after the initial influx of
Palestinian refugees in 1948. At that time approximately
90, 000--100, 000 Palestinians took refuge in Syria. Presently
more than 250,000 Palestinians continue to reside within
Syria, a mere 2-3 percent of the total population. About 70
percent of these live either in Damascus or in nearby camps.
[Ref. 64]
Syrian treatment of their refugees is unique among the
Arab states which harbor displaced Palestinians. As early as
1949, "the Syrian government began to issue what eventually
developed into a series of laws that placed Palestinians on
virtually equal footing with Syrian nationals." [Ref. 65]
Asad has continued the tradition of extending to the
Palestinians all rights that ordinary Syrians enjoy--with the
41
obvious exceptions of citizenship and the right to vote (for
whatever that is worth)
.
The right to work and to join labor unions, equal access
to government services, including education, and the duty
to serve in the army have combined with strong popular
Arab nationalist sentiment in Syria to allow for a greater
degree of socioeconomic and, in some cases, political
integration than in any other Arab state but Jordan. [Ref
.
66]
By holding fast to the notion that Palestine, like Lebanon, is
only one part of Greater Syria, Asad further tries to
discourage the expression of a separate Palestinian identity.
For example, Damascus Radio announced in June 1980 that "Syria
views Palestine—according to historic, cultural, and
geographic factors--as its own southern province." [Ref. 67]
Asad himself has made statements which attempt to blur the
line between national identities. Speaking to PLO
representatives in 1976, Asad told them:
You do not represent Palestine as much as we do. Do not
forget one thing: there is no Palestinian people, no
Palestinian entity, there is only Syria! You are an
integral part of the Syrian people and Palestine is an
integral part of Syria. Therefore it is we, the Syrian
authorities, who are the real representatives of the
Palestinian people. [Ref. 68]
Asad's remark is, of course, contradictory: In one breath he
insists that there is no such thing as a Palestinian people,
and in the next he states that the Syrian authorities
represent the Palestinians. While one might wonder how the
Syrian authorities manage to represent a non-existent people,
what should be noted is Asad's stated conviction that the
Palestinians are a Syrian people--and have been a Syrian
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people for some time. This also explains why Asad takes
pleasure in startling Western visitors with the revelation
that "Jesus Christ was a Syrian Jew." [Ref. 69]
Asad must also remain faithful to the Palestinians for the
sake of pan-Arab principles, not the least of which involves
the return of Arab lands from Israel. This poses a minor
problem for Asad. Return of the Golan Heights is a high
priority, but not one which can be divorced from the
Palestinians' aspirations.
Having made the Palestinian cause a central plank in
Syrian domestic and international policy for the past 20
years, diplomats say, Mr. Assad could scarcely abandon it
now. "Assad feels he is the custodian of Arab virtue on
Palestine," says [a] European diplomat. "Just getting
your bit of the Golan back is not a worthy goal for a
great Arab leader. Getting what the Palestinians want
would really mark him out." [Ref. 70]
Former ambassador to Syria Talcott Seelye notes that as
important as the Golan Heights is for Asad, there is no reason
to believe that he would sell out the Palestinians to get back
that piece of land: "It is a constant of Syrian policy to
link the fate of the Golan with that of the Palestinians.
That is, Syria does not intend to make peace with Israel over
the Golan without parallel movement on the Palestinian front."
[Ref. 71]
Although some of Asad's policy decisions regarding the
Palestinians are driven by unforgiving realities, others are
of a more opportunistic nature. By promoting himself as a
spokesman for the Palestinians, Asad hopes to maintain the
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relevancy of Syria in Arab and world politics. Without the
primacy of the Palestinian cause on the Arab agenda, Syria's
self -declared role as Palestinian advocate is largely
meaningless, and Syrian influence in the Arab world ebbs.
This relationship between Syrian authority and Palestinian
ambitions is well illustrated by the Palestinian intifada.
"The most significant factor in returning Syria to prominence
in Arab politics may be the Palestinian uprising in the
Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza, which moved the Arab-
Israeli conflict back to the top of the Arab agenda and
revived Syria's role as the principal Arab country confronting
Israel." [Ref. 72]
Syria has traditionally supported a number of Palestinian
organizations in order to exploit this association.
Originally Syria promoted al-Fatah as a counter to the PLO,
created by Nasser in 1964. Syria also supported George
Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
and continues to assist its splinter organization, Ahmed
Jibril's PFLP--General Command. Furthermore, the Palestine
Liberation Army's Hittin and Qadisiya Brigades were
subordinate to the Syrian Ministry of Defense when they
entered Lebanon in 1976.
Asad has continued this tradition of support principally
through the Vanguards of the Popular War of Liberation, more
commonly known as as-Sa ' iqa-- "Thunderbolt . " Shortly after
assuming power Asad purged the ranks of Sa'iqa, which had been
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created in 1966, and placed a reliable Baath friend, Zuhayr
Mushin, in charge of the organization. Asad hoped to promote
Sa'iqa as the primary voice of the Palestinian cause and thus
expand his own influence. Sa'iqa's raison d'etre is clear.
A classified 1979 report by the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) labelled Sa'iqa a "Trojan horse maneuvering for Syria
within the Palestinian movement, " and described its objectives
as "identical with those of Syria . . .All [Sa'iqa's] exploits
in the Middle East and Western Europe were authorized, and
perhaps planned, by the Syrian Army G-2 [intelligence] ." [Ref.
73]
Sa'iqa and the PFLP--GC, like the PLA brigades, were used
by Asad when he elected to invade Lebanon in 1976. But they
have also proven themselves reliable allies in Asad's constant
efforts to undermine Yassir Arafat. If Asad placed higher
priority on using the Palestinian cause to build his regime's
legitimacy rather than its influence, it is more likely that
he would set his sails to the prevailing winds of Palestinian
sentiments, and therefore would have spent the better part of
the last ten years supporting Arafat rather than feuding with
him.
The reconciliation that took place between Asad and Arafat
in May of 1991 should not be mistaken as an attempt by Asad to
appeal to these Palestinian sensibilities. The arrangement
between Asad and Arafat smacks of a simple quid pro quo made
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necessary by political developments which came with the Gulf
crisis .
Arab analysts say Syria and the PLO were compelled to
reconcile in hopes of easing their isolation following the
Gulf war. The two were on different sides in the war, but
Syria's role as advocate of pan-Arab nationalism was
damaged when it joined the US-led coalition against Iraq,
and the PLO was discredited in the West and among the Gulf
states (its major financial backers) when it sided with
Iraq, they say.
Syria hopes that by securing Palestinian backing it
will regain some of its lost pan-Arab credentials and be
able to pose as the major Arab player in the peace
process. The PLO hopes that, with Syrian support, the US
will find it hard to exclude the organization from the
talks. [Ref. 74]
Despite this mutual accommodation, Syria and the PLO are a
long way from becoming completely reconciled to one another.
It is worth remembering that Asad's antipathy for Arafat--
which is, of course, reciprocated--goes back over twenty
years; in 1966 Asad jailed Arafat and some of his associates
who were bristling under the restraint of their Syrian
guardians. Furthermore, those Syrians not partisan to
traditional Islam share Asad's misgivings with the PLO leader
because of Arafat's early sympathies for the Muslim Brethren.
In spite of the friction that exists between himself and
Arafat, Asad feels a sense of obligation to the Palestinian
cause, and therefore would not consider recovery of the Golan
without similar progress on the West Bank. However, this
obligation dovetails with his perception that he may not be
able to achieve the return of the Golan without attaching it
to the return of Palestinian land. One of Asad's greatest
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fears is that an agreement between the Palestinians and Israel
would not only make the chances of recovering the Golan even
more remote, but would humiliate his regime as well. These
fears were particularly profound, Itamar Rabinovich observed,
two years into the Intifada:
Syria did express support for the intifada, but PLO leader
Yasir Arafat and the PLO remained Syria's bitter rivals,
and their success and enhanced stature in Arab politics
were ominously received in Damascus. Syria was even more
alarmed by the prospect of Palestinian-Israeli
negotiations or a settlement. Any progress toward a
Palestinian-Israeli settlement would have underscored
Syria's failure to regain the Golan Heights. [Ref. 75]
Thus, failure to address the Palestinian cause poses a threat
to Asad's regime, but not always on the merits of the
Palestinian cause per se; rather, Asad must avoid Palestinian
gains in the absence of progress on the Golan Heights, lest
his government be depicted as an impotent player in Arab or
international politics. This factor continues to be an
important consideration in the conduct of Syrian foreign
policy, and thereby explains certain Syrian behaviors
witnessed throughout the current peace negotiations which
began in Madrid last December.
To conclude this section, Asad is pre-occupied with
manipulating the Palestinian cause to further his ambitions,
but he recognizes the limited utility the Palestinians have as
regards his primary ambition: regime legitimacy and survival.
While Palestinian aspirations are not completely devoid of
usefulness as a legitimacy-building tool, he is more concerned
47
that they will be used against him by exposing his government
as incapable of making progress on an issue of utmost
importance to the Syrian people--the Golan Heights, which,
incidentally, is the next legitimacy-building device worthy of
scrutiny
.
D. THE GOLAN HEIGHTS
The Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights is Asad's most
reliable and effective asset vis-a-vis Israel for building his
regime's legitimacy. Because it is Asad's most potent
legitimizing agent, the return of the Golan is Syria's number
one foreign policy objective. This reflects the fact that the
Israeli presence on the Golan pre-occupies the thoughts of
nearly all Syrians. The urgency of regaining the Golan has
the unusual if not rare impact of uniting the Syrian people,
and is therefore also useful to the regime for the purpose of
discouraging ethnic, class, and political differences.
Furthermore, Israeli settlement of the Golan reinforces Syrian
"demonization" of Israel. At the same time, however, Asad
must tread carefully when using the Golan to justify the
conduct of his government, for he himself shares in some of
the blame for the loss of the Heights. Nevertheless, fanning
the flames of Syrian indignation over the Golan is Asad's best
device for obtaining the backing of the Syrian people.
In fact, Asad's war for the Golan in 1973 served as his
"touchstone" for legitimacy, but that is something which is
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more appropriately discussed later. Likewise, the Golan is a
recurring theme--along with other anti-Israeli devices--during
times of crisis, and when Asad is explicitly challenged by
those who wish to replace or remove him. Similarly, these
subjects deserve specific and separate attention and will not
be addressed here. Instead, this section endeavors to
demonstrate the inherent value of the Golan as a legitimizing
agent rather than its actual use as such.
Frankly, a good deal of the Golan' s value to Asad results
from Israel's unwitting complicity in making it a reservoir of
political capital for their enemy in Damascus. First, the
seizure of the Golan by Israeli forces in 1967 came several
hours after Syria had requested a ceasefire on June 9, and
well after Egypt had accepted an unconditional ceasefire the
same day. The Israelis, concentrating their forces on
defeating the Egyptians, whom they perceived as a more
profound threat to Israel, had for all purposes left the
Syrians alone on the Golan during the first days of the war.
After Egypt was taken out of the contest and the Israeli army
had repositioned forces to the north, Moshe Dayan apparently
decided to attack the Golan, and did so without consulting his
civilian superiors in the Israeli government . The Israelis
did not relent until they had seized a strongpoint on Mt .
Hermon on June 10. Whatever the Israeli rationale or
motivation for waiting to attack Syria along the Golan
Heights, the Syrian perception is that Israel's attack was
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unjustifiable insofar that it came after a ceasefire was
offered. The Israelis similarly provoked Syrian wrath in the
aftermath of the 1973 war. As part of a disengagement
settlement on the Golan Heights, the Israelis agreed to
abandon Qunaytra, the principal town on the Golan.
But before evacuating it the Israelis blew up and
bulldozed buildings, water storage tanks and communication
lines, as they had done in the Suez area, and were duly
condemned for this at the United Nations. The destruction
of the town confirmed the Syrians in their view of the
Israelis as latter-day Vandals. [Ref. 76]
Israeli settlements on the Golan only exacerbate the depth
of Syrian resentment, and thus contribute to the Golan 's
usefulness as a legitimizing agent. Indeed, the speed with
which the Israelis began settlement efforts was itself a
source of irritation. On July 15, 1967, little more than a
month after hostilities had ended, the Israelis established
Merom Golan, their first settlement in occupied territory.
[Ref. 77]
Israel has continued to settle the Golan, and adamantly
asserts its right and willingness to do so. In 1974 Yitzhak
Rabin announced, "Israeli governments have not established
permanent settlements in the Golan Heights in order to
evacuate them or to let them exist in a non-Jewish state. If
anyone has any doubts about that he should stop worrying."
[Ref. 78] In April of 1979 Ariel Sharon, at the time Minister
of Agriculture, tried to allay settlers' fears: "We will
never leave the Golan for any price, not even for peace with
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Syria." More recently, Sharon, in his capacity as Housing
Minister, promised to accelerate building efforts: "We are
now in the process of building 1,200 housing units in the
Golan Heights, and I hope next year we will build some 1,200
more. All this is to increase the [Jewish] population in the
Golan from 11,000 today to 20,000." [Ref. 79]
The most ardent supporters of settlements must be
disappointed with the history of the Golan' s settlement.
Zionist planners once hoped for 50,000 settlers on the Golan,
but currently little more than 12,000 live there. On top of
that, the Golan settlements require substantial sums of
financial assistance. Unlike the West Bank, the Golan has no
religious significance to most Israelis. Although it does
offer some excellent agricultural opportunities, this alone
does not attract much settlement interest.
The recent influx of Russian Jews, however, may have
renewed the hopes of those Israelis who believe settlement of
the Golan is in Israel's strategic interests. "The Israeli
Government moved 25 Soviet immigrant families into a patch of
the northern Golan Heights on Monday, hours after Syria and
Israel ended face-to-face talks in Madrid that failed to reach
agreement on a time and site for further Middle East peace
negotiations." [Ref. 80] Naturally, the timing of such moves
only strengthens Asad by confirming the widespread Syrian
perception that the occupation of the Golan serves Israel's
imperialist interests.
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Israel's official government pronouncements also play into
Asad's hands. In December of 1981 Prime Minister Begin pushed
through the Knesset a measure which formally annexed the Golan
Heights. And in 1977 the Likud government's "Fundamental
Guidelines" declared that "Israel will not descend from the
Golan Heights, nor will it remove any settlement established
there." [Ref. 81] As recently as November of 1991 the Knesset
passed a resolution which not only reiterated Israel's
position on the Heights as nonnegotiable, but which also
encouraged further settlement there. No one should
underestimate the importance of the Golan in the collective
mind of the Syrian people. The following anecdote aptly
illustrates the depth of feeling. Shortly after the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait a newspaper reporter interviewed a Syrian
restaurant cook in Damascus. When the reporter inquired the
man about his thoughts on the "current" Mideast crisis--this
was several weeks after the invasion had taken place--the man
instinctively replied, "If the Zionists don't leave our land,
we will have another war, for sure." [Ref. 82] Asad is of
course well aware of these widespread sentiments, and does not
hesitate using them to stir popular passions.
The public campaign to liberate the Golan has been
unremitting. There is no evidence that a Ba'ath
government, humiliated by its poor showing against Israel
in 1967, has tried to soft-pedal the issue. Quite the
contrary: Syrians were constantly reminded of the Israeli
occupation and of the certainty that the occupied Golan
would be retaken by Syria.
Thus, the primary issue with respect to the Golan
has never been whether to accept its loss or to seek its
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return. Instead, issues have concerned the means and
timing of its recovery. Virtually all Syrians have
accepted the need for force in the effort. [Ref. 83]
Asad is especially fond of quoting Moshe Dayan's speech to
soldiers on the Golan Heights in 1973 as evidence of Israel's
appetite for expansion: "Our predecessors made the Israel of
the 1948 frontiers, our generation that of the 1967 frontiers,
now its up to you to make Greater Israel." [Ref. 84] Asad is
not above doing a little saber-rattling himself if it suits
his purpose; he once declared: "If Israel has a plan to make
the Golan its border, Syria has a plan to place the Golan in
the center of Syria." [Ref. 85] Some Israelis naturally
interpret Asad's statement as evidence that Syria is not only
interested in regaining the Golan but would march into
northern Israel if given the opportunity. "More likely, this
is a typical Syrian rhetorical flourish, an example of Assad's
seeking to emphasize dramatically the importance Syria
attaches to the Golan. The speech reveals that Assad is
determined that some day the Golan should be returned to
Syria." [Ref. 86] In other words, Asad is simply asserting to
the world--but especially to the Syrian people, to whom it
matters most--that he places highest priority on recovering
the Golan.
Asad's words are not empty rhetoric: Syria maintains
considerable ground forces, the vast majority of which are
deployed along the relatively small front facing the Israelis
on the Golan Heights. [Ref. 87] While this deployment also
53
reflects Asad's determination to defend Damascus --which is a
mere thirty miles from the Golan border--the number of Syrian
ground forces dedicated to the Golan front obviates the
possibility of a strictly defensive Syrian posture. In this
way, words and deeds affirm Asad's determination to recover
the Golan, the most basic litmus test of legitimacy the Syrian
people could apply. In fact, it may be an even more important
test for Asad than for any other leader who might one day fill
his shoes; as chief of staff of the air force during the 1967
war, Asad feels particularly responsible for Syria's loss.
E. THE SYRIAN ECONOMY
Economic improvement is at the very core of any
government's responsibilities. This being the case, economic
growth can function as a veritable wellspring of legitimizing
authority. On the other hand, economic contraction or
privation might likewise strip away a government's moral claim
to authority. In the case of Syria it is clear that while
Asad has tried to improve his country's economic lot, it is an
ambition which has been subordinated to other goals . It would
be unreasonable to posit that Asad does not view economic
growth -as a source of legitimacy; evidence suggests that he
has used it, like other legitimizing tools, for that purpose.
But economic growth is not wielded as a primary source of
legitimacy. Its selection for this purpose could be an unwise
choice given Syria's economic endowments. In fact, economic
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growth is pursued as a means by which to fuel the expansion of
Syria's military capabilities--the very capabilities necessary
if Asad is to present himself, and Syria, credibly in his
confrontation with Israel.
It would have been folly for Asad to have made economic
growth the cornerstone of his regime's legitimacy after he
came to power. Syria is not only a country which boasts few
natural resources, but one which must overcome a number of
liabilities. For example: "Without a river system like those
in Egypt and Iraq, Syria was without an economic and
communications network to unite the country. . . economies
developed locally often had little connection with areas
elsewhere in Syria." [Ref. 88] Among Syria's current,
fundamental problems is its population's growth rate, which in
1986 was estimated to be 3.7 percent. As it is Syria cannot
provide basic services for its present population of roughly
12 million. "Syria has shortages of housing, electricity and
water and its population is expected to double, to 25 million,
over the next two decades." [Ref. 89] Given the economic
realities in Syria, it is difficult to argue that Asad,
intelligent man that he is, would chose economic success--it
being so difficult to achieve--as a fundamental source of
legitimacy
.
This does not mean that Asad will not use the economy when
he can to engender support for his regime. It has already
been mentioned that Asad is not the doctrinaire socialist as
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was his predecessor, Salah Jadid. Not long after taking power
Asad cut food prices, lifted restrictions on trade with
Lebanon, and otherwise maneuvered to win the favor of the
private sector.
.
[Asad] knew he needed allies in the urban middle
class, so, breaking with his political past, he tried to
win over the shopkeepers, businessmen and artisans of the
towns as well as the many citizens who had fled Syria
since 1963, mainly Sunnis form the former leading
families. [Ref. 90]
Similarly, Asad endeavored to buttress his rural support by
promoting development in areas long neglected in favor of the
cities. As Thomas Friedman has observed, these efforts paid
important dividends
.
These practices won [Asad's regime] a certain degree of
legitimacy, which can be seen when one visits some far-
flung Syrian village in which the relatively stable Assad
government has built a new road, a medical clinic, a new
school, extended electricity, and connected telephone
lines. It is quite possible to find in such a village a
Sunni Muslim villager who has hung a picture of Alawite
President Assad on his wall, not simply because it will
ingratiate him with the local party and intelligence
officials, but also because he sincerely feels that this
man Assad has behaved not just as an Alawite, and not just
as a power-hungry autocrat, but as his own President, with
a national interest in mind. [Ref. 91]
These exceptions notwithstanding, Asad clearly could not hope
to create widespread acceptance of his regime based solely on
economic factors.
In fact, some observers of Syrian politics and its economy
think Asad has little enthusiasm for economic matters. "Asad
has never taken a close interest in economic af fairs--with the
important exception of oil." [Ref. 92] It may be, then, that
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Syria's economy suffers from, among other things, a certain
amount of supervisory neglect. The absence of executive
oversight is found in the ubiquitous corruption which infects
Syria's political structure. Asad's tolerance of this
corruption--or his inability to control it--unsettles the
masses, and may potentially erode the legitimacy he has gained
elsewhere
.
The most salient domestic political issue, that of
"official corruption, " involves not simply the legitimacy
of high-ranking state and party officials, but also the
basis for collaboration among the forces making up the
regime. To the extent that the costs of widespread
collusion between Syria's commercial and industrial elite
and the leadership of the Ba'th become politically or
economically unmanageable, the ruling coalition will face
fundamental internal difficulties. [Ref. 93]
While a permissive atmosphere has been instrumental in winning
over key segments of the military, corruption has nevertheless
had the effect of making Syria's economic maladies that much
less tolerable to the general public. Consequently, one could
well argue that the economy, in its current state, is more
likely to debilitate Asad's efforts to build regime
legitimacy, rather than add to it.
Syria's enormous military expenditures are a tangible
manifestation of the priority placed on that country's contest
with Israel. Between 1973 and 1985 Syria devoted 18 percent
of its Gross Domestic Product to military purchases. Within
the Middle East, Syria was surpassed in this category only by
Iraq and Saudi Arabia. [Ref. 94] Syria has routinely
earmarked fifty percent or more of its central government
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expenditures for defense. The cost of keeping so many men
under arms also impacts upon Syria's labor pool. In 1985,
Syria's 400,000 troops represented one-sixth of the country's
entire work force. [Ref . 95] The overall drain on the economy
is profound.
Indeed, the imperatives of national security state [sic]
take precedence over all else, and the confrontation with
Israel continues to block any radical departure from
etatism: the military absorbs a large portion of public
revenues that might otherwise stimulate capitalist
development, and the conflict diverts private investment
from productive fields into short-term speculative
ventures and makes Syria ineligible for foreign private
investment on a serious scale. [Ref. 96]
The important question that needs to be asked is: Do the
Syrian people object to the burden of these large military
expenditures? The answer: Not as long as the monies are
directed to defeating Israel. Public sentiment after the 1973
war is illustrative. The war brought extraordinary
destruction on Syria's infrastructure. A New York Times
correspondent, in Damascus as the fighting took place, made
the following observation: "The political goal of recovering
Syrian land occupied by Israel in the 1967 war is an issue
charged with such emotion here that losses in lives and money
appear to be shouldered willingly by the public." [Ref. 97]
Even after the war had ended and Syrian forces had been
repulsed, Syrians did not object to the economic setback they
suffered
.
Power cuts here are frequent. Many factories are unable
to work full shifts for lack of electricity. Schools have
gone to daylight classes only. Many housewives have
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difficulty finding kerosene for cooking, and heat is
missing in some houses with evenings getting colder.
But there is no noticeable grumbling. There is plenty
of food in the markets at stable prices. It is hard to
find a taxi at night, but restaurants and discotheques are
lively. [Ref. 98]
Even when taking into consideration the intoxicating effect of
victory--no matter how short-lived--against the Israelis,
Syrian willingness to bear the brunt of an unrelenting
military burden is remarkable.
Part of the Syrian public's quiescence regarding military
spending, however, may reflect government efforts to present
the Syrian burden as quite ordinary for the region.
Specifically, anecdotal evidence suggests that many Syrians
mistakenly believe that other Middle East citizens,
particularly the Israelis, are worse off than themselves.
Indeed, the following story suggests that many Syrians believe
the Israelis are starving because of outrageously large
Israeli military expenditures: In a move to counter domestic
Syrian propaganda, a Syrian army captain who had been captured
in the 1973 war was permitted to tour Israel freely before
being repatriated. The Syrian army captain insisted on being
taken to the market at Haifa. His appointed driver complied.
"When they arrived in the crowded streets, the captain ordered
the driver to stop, got out of the car, chose a small store at
random, went in, and asked for eggs. When the merchant
nonchalantly produced a carton, the Syrian was astonished. 'I
believed you were starving, ' he told his guide." [Ref. 99]
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Such internal propaganda efforts persist in Syria. As
recently as December of 1991, the Syrian Information Minister
spoke of the (imagined) concern that all societies share
concerning the acquisition of food.
[Minister Salman] spoke about the Syrian Government's
eagerness to secure food security for the Syrian citizen,
given that the question of food security has become the
major preoccupation of all societies in view of the
expected large increase in the number of the world's
population. [Ref. 100]
While it is not disputed that a number of Middle East
countries are rightfully concerned with feeding their
populations, the minister's hyperbolic comments are
nevertheless misleading. The subliminal message being sent by
the minister was that Syrians should be thankful that they had
enough to eat; it would then, of course, be ungrateful for the
Syrian public to complain about wanting other, more material
comforts
.
Assuming that the Syrians were aware of their relative
deprivation, would that make the importance of economic
prosperity transcend Israel as a legitimizing agent? Given
the depth of antipathy towards Israel, it is difficult to
imagine that it would. While persistent economic hardship
might make Asad's task of legitimacy-building more difficult,
there is no reason to believe that, by itself, economic growth
would substantially contribute to his cause--even if it were
possible to achieve growth on the scale necessary to boost
Asad's popular credentials, which it is not. It is possible,
60
however, that economic concerns could eclipse Israel as a
legitimizing agent if anti-Israeli feelings were to eventually
subside
.
Finally, Asad's post-Gulf War spending habits reinforce
the argument that Asad is more concerned with the
confrontation with Israel than he is with elevating the
economic well-being of his country. Saudi Arabia rewarded
Syria with $2 billion for its participation in the
international coalition against Iraq. This was an enormous
sum considering that $2 billion also represents the amount
spent by the Syrian government during its previous fiscal
year. Rather than spending the money to develop its
infrastructure or to pay off debt to Western lenders (to whom
Syria is in arrears) , Asad elected to reactivate an armored
division and to purchase Scud-C missiles, T-72 tanks and Su-24
ground attack aircraft. To imagine that economic development
or well-being has eclipsed Israel as Asad's primary
legitimizing agent would be foolish.
F. CHARISMA
Charisma--a quality which grants certain individuals
widespread devotion on the basis of "exceptional sanctity,
heroism or exemplary character " --is perhaps the most powerful
yet intangible of legitimizing agents available to a leader.
[Ref. 101] Among the traditional societies of the Middle
East, personal leadership can be particularly important.
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Nasser is the best example of a leader whose magnetism alone
gave him a seemingly unchallengeable position of legitimacy.
Bourguiba was another. Charisma, if a leader has it, gives
that individual unusual freedom of movement in the political
arena. But typically charisma is not something that a leader
can develop--either he has it or he does not. Nasser is an
important exception, but rare is the leader who can cultivate
charisma where it did not exist, at least in some measure,
beforehand. Whatever the case, Asad is not charismatic, nor
is there any evidence to suggest that he has at anytime tried
to become a charismatic figure. Thus, charisma can be
dismissed out of hand as a source of any legitimizing
authority for Asad.
A strong argument can be made that Asad may credit his
personal style for his long and successful navigation of
Syria's treacherous political waters. According to Moshe
Ma'oz, "Assad's personal qualities and political skills
largely account for the preservation of his position." [Ref.
102] Indeed, the superlatives come easily to mind when
describing Asad: He is cunning and shrewd, patient and
brilliant, tireless and calculating. But these personal
qualities, and the many more which Asad does possess, do not
necessarily endow him with any measure of charisma.
Asad certainly enjoys the respect and admiration of many
of Syria's elite politicians. Asad's keen intellect, strong
will, and confident bearing engender loyalty and affection
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among those who sit just below Asad in Syria's political
hierarchy. "He enjoys a unique personal stature among elites,
respected for his combination of conciliatory pragmatism,
ruthlessness , and shrewd audacity in the international arena."
[Ref . 103] Seale notes that Asad, realizing this, has himself
tried to encourage the creation of a "personality cult" among
his colleagues.
Despite the adulation he might receive among his inner
circle, Asad rarely travels or avails himself publicly to the
Syrian people. For example, it has been over twelve years
since he visited Aleppo, Syria's second largest city. Asad's
reclusive nature could be the result of health or security
concerns, but the fact remains that most Syrians see him
mainly on television. Even if Asad were to venture out into
the public more often, his personality is not inspirational.
[Asad's] public persona is not particularly appealing. He
has always been formal and reserved, traits that the
exercise of power have not eroded, without a gift for easy
contact with people or the charisma and oratorical powers
of a populist leader able to harangue the crowd. His
style of public speaking is stilted, although his mastery
of classical Arabic, considered the mark of a nationalist,
is admired. Asad is probably cleverer than the late
President Nasser of Egypt, the Arab leader with whom he
best stands comparison, but he does not have Nasser's
ability to move men's hearts. [Ref. 104]
Asad's aloof character has led Seale to speculate that Asad
embraces Machiavelli ' s dictum that to lead men you must turn
your back on them.
If he could, Asad would certainly elect to cultivate
charisma for its powerful legitimizing authority. But alas,
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charisma is typically an innate endowment, and so he cannot.
Instead, Asad devotes his energies to building legitimacy with
those devices which are at his disposal.
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IV. ISRAEL'S LEGITIMIZING FUNCTION AT WORK
Simply eliminating Asad's alternative legitimizing agents
by itself does not persuasively make the argument that he is
dependent upon perpetuating his contest with Israel in order
to perpetuate his regime. To accomplish this, it must also be
demonstrated that the conflict with Israel has enhanced Asad's
position as well as assisted him during times of crisis.
Syria's participation in the 1973 War served to anchor Asad's
presidency. Furthermore, Asad's use of anti-Israeli themes
when his regime has been threatened corroborates the thesis
that Israel is the primary legitimizing agent of his
presidency
.
A. THE RAMADAN WAR
Asad's very rise to power rested upon his conviction that
Israel posed a significant security concern, one which his
predecessor, Salah Jadid, was neglecting at Syria's peril.
The interrelated goals of Arab unity and war against
Israel were indeed the major motivation and pretext of
Asad's coups in 1969 and 1970 as well as the principal
themes of his public speeches and political actions after
his assumption of control. . . during the late 1960s Asad
had strongly opposed the policies of the then Syrian
leaders, Jadid and Atasi, who had rejected the concept of
an all-Arab war against Israel because most Arab countries
were governed by ."rightist" or "reactionary" regimes.
[Ref. 105]
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It is no coincidence that Asad's first attempt at a coup
d'etat in February of 1969 came on the heels of an Israeli air
raid on Palestinian military camps near Damascus which
revealed Syria's military impotence. Shortly after he took
power, Asad reaffirmed his dedication to the struggle against
Israel. Asad himself stated: "It is a fatal confrontation,
of life or death, of existence or non-existence. . . It is not
a struggle between Arabs and Jews. . . we do not hate Judaism
as a religion but we hate Zionism as a colonialist invading
movement." [Ref. 106]
There are several reasons, relevant to this essay, which
compelled Asad to go to war with Israel in 1973. First, Asad
himself felt a share of responsibility for the loss of the
Golan in 1967 since he was then the air force chief of staff.
In the immediate aftermath of that war a number of Baath party
elites angrily demanded his resignation from the Defense
Ministry and sought to expel him from the Regional Command.
Asad was so despondent afterwards that he "went home and
brooded over the catastrophe for three days, refusing to see
anyone." [Ref. 107] Second, after having castigated Jadid for
abandoning the confrontation with Israel, Asad had little
choice but to put his army where his mouth was. Asad could
not afford to have his anti-Israel protestations depicted as
empty rhetoric. Third, the Syrian public, believing that




From 1970, and even earlier, Egypt and Jordan had in their
different fashions attempted to find a modus vivendi with
Israel, reaching out a hand to it and offering real
concessions, but Syria wanted to put the clock back to
before Israel's conquests in the Six Day War. In this
Asad was merely reflecting what his public demanded.
Hardly reconciled to Israel's existence within its prewar
frontiers, Syrians were outraged by its wartime expansion
and believed that what had been taken by force could only
be regained by force. [Ref. 108]
Finally, Asad knew that a well-conducted campaign would give
him extraordinary latitude and strength in the post-war
political arena--both domestically and internationally. The
very decision to take to arms flowed from Asad's perception
that his domestic position was slowly eroding. This
precarious situation was one he shared with his partner in
war, Sadat: "The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, noting the waves of riots by workers and students in
Egypt in 1972 and 1973 and Sunni Muslim protests in Syria in
early 1973 argued that 'The very [political] weakness of Sadat
and Assad were important factors in the decision to launch war
on Israel . ' " [Ref. 109]
Although neither Asad or Sadat would fully realize the
territorial ambitions each entertained on the eve of the
conflict (recovering some or all of the territory lost to
Israel in 1967), both men would emerge from the war with
renewed political vigor at home. "The brio, style and courage
of the blows struck at the very start were to give both
leaders something like a blank cheque on a fund of political
capital allowing them much freedom of action thereafter."
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[Ref . 110] The war also permitted Syria to reassert itself as
a player in Arab and world politics. Syria had become a force
with which to be reckoned. Syria's new international esteem
only further boosted Asad's domestic political clout. "The
1973 war rallied wide sectors of opinion to the regime and
endowed it with a new nationalist legitimacy. Finally Syria's
new role in the front line with Israel won it Arab aid and
loans, fueling a prosperity of which the urban bourgeoisie and
middle class took best advantage." [Ref. Ill] The 1973 War
was so potent a legitimizing force that it won for Asad the
begrudging--if temporary--respect of that group which Asad's
Baath politics had inevitably alienated, the urban middle
class .
Asad's conduct both during and after the war won him the
admiration of the Syrian people. Asad put his very regime on
the line by electing to go to war with Israel. Moreover, the
Syrian public could not help but venerate Asad for carrying
into battle ambitions which were more noble than those of
their ally, Egypt. "Unlike Sadat--whose war aims were limited
to crossing the Suez Canal, occupying the eastern bank up to
the Sinai passes, and thereafter generating American pressure
on Israel to give up the entire Sinai--Asad' s goal was to
reconquer the entire Golan Heights to the Jordan river and
possibly occupy its bridges." [Ref. 112] When the war was
over and disengagement negotiations began, Asad refused to
appear weak, even though the Israeli army was perched just
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outside of Damascus, and was restrained from marching into the
Syrian capital only due to countervailing pressure from the US
and the Soviet Union.
Before he dealt with the Israeli enemy following the 1973
war, Assad was determined to prove to the Arab world that,
unlike Egypt, Syria was not negotiating under duress. . .
What tipped the scales in favor of entering the
talks was the pressure resulting from the presence of the
Israeli army roughly 25 miles from Damascus.
Nevertheless, Assad began the negotiations by making far-
reaching demands, as if he were the victor. But Assad did
not shut the door tight.
His method paid off in the end. The agreement
required Israel to give up not only the land occupied
since the 1973 war but also the town of Qunietra on the
Golan Heights, which was seized in 1967. [Ref. 113]
Asad's audacious behavior had the desired effect not just at
the negotiating table, but at home as well. His determination
to stand up to the Israelis and Americans was viewed with
pride
.
Asad's ability in the Ramadan War to snatch victory from
the jaws of defeat gave him a firm foundation for his regime's
legitimacy. Since then it has been to Asad's advantage to
beat the drums of war and to reiterate the threat posed by
"expansionist" Israel. But the passage of time has diminished
the effectiveness of the war as a legitimizing agent of the
regime: Given Syria's high birthrate, much of Syria's current
population was either very young or not even born at the time
of the 1973 war. Other Middle East developments have likewise
decreased--but not erased--the value of the Ramadan War as a
legitimizing agent.
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One of Assad's main assets, both internally and in the
Arab world, has been his stand as defender of the Arab
cause against Israel. But even here his ability to
exploit the "Israeli threat" appears to be diminishing
. . .An increasing number of Syrians, particularly Sunnis,
may be realizing that the regime is exploiting the war
against Israel to ensure Alawi domination. Despite strong
criticism of its peace with Israel, Egypt's success in
regaining the whole of the Sinai Peninsula from Israel
through political negotiations has probably registered
some effect on the Syrian public. For many Arabs, Israel,
after its failure in Lebanon, appears to be less of a
threat. [Ref. 114]
It is difficult to gauge precisely when Asad realized that the
conflict with Israel was a legitimizing agent that could be
used to his regime's advantage beyond the context of war.
After all, Asad may have been aware of its utility long before
he ascended to the presidency. It is much easier to pinpoint
when Asad began to explicitly use anti-Israeli themes to
support his regime and defeat its challengers.
Coincidentally, this use came during the constitutional crisis
of 1973.
B. THE 1973 CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
The significant role that the 1973 War played in
legitimizing Asad's rule becomes more obvious when one
considers developments within Syria earlier that same year.
It was briefly mentioned that Asad was confronted by serious
internal opposition during the first months of 1973 and that
the resultant weakening of his position played some part in
his decision to wage war. This unrest was the apparent by-
product of Sunni Moslem discontent with Syria's new
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constitution. This opposition--which had been vociferous--
completely dissolved after the war with Israel, thus
demonstrating Israel's efficacy as a legitimizing force. To
illustrate this point, it would be helpful to consider the
particulars of that crisis.
The 1973 constitutional crisis was directly linked to the
issue of Asad's religious convictions as an Alawi . Asad of
course realized the liability of his heritage, and to stave
off criticism made a number of moves immediately after taking
power to silence would-be religious rabble rousers. To wit,
Asad promoted 2,000 religious functionaries in rank and
salary, and appointed an ' a lira as Minister of Religious
Endowments. Asad also encouraged the construction of
additional mosques.
On a more personal level Asad tried to depict himself as
a pious Muslim by participating in prayers and other religious
services, going so far as to make the hajj to Mecca, albeit at
an irregular time. Asad was assisted by the Mufti of Damascus
who verified the president's authenticity as a Muslim. [Ref.
115] Asad's efforts to polish his public image as a Muslim
did not stop there: "In June 1971, Assad restored to the
Syrian constitution the previous formulation of the
presidential oath, 'I swear by Allah Akbar, ' which had been
replaced by a secular format ( ' I swear on my honour and
faith') in the 1969 constitution." [Ref. 116] Not all of
Asad's various ploys were as sanguine. In 1972 the government
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published a special edition of the Qur'an with a picture of
Asad in uniform on the first page. Many devout Muslims were,
quite naturally, offended. All of these gestures highlighted
Asad's sensitivity to religious issues as well as an
appreciation of his vulnerability. While Asad's endeavors may
have had the short-term effect of quieting his Islamic
opponents, it did not neutralize them. In early 1973 Asad
constructed a new constitution that would endow him with
substantial executive and legislative powers. Before the
draft form of that constitution was offered in late January,
Asad himself deleted a clause which stipulated that the Syrian
president must be Muslim. Asad's deletion inflamed latent
anger among religious elements of Syria's population. Many
Syrians were also upset by the constitution's less-than-
enthusiastic endorsement of the shari'a as the source of all
legislation. The article concerning the shari'a "was inserted
in no very prominent place, and its curt matter-of -factness
was in striking contrast to the fervent Ba'thist rhetoric of
the rest of the text." [Ref. 117] All this incensed dedicated
Muslims who not only demanded a Muslim president, but also
insisted that Islam be declared the state religion. "Viewing
the constitution as the product of an Alawi-dominated,
secular, Baathist ruling elite, Sunni militants staged a
series of riots in February 1973 in conservative and
predominantly Sunni cities such as Hamah and Horns." [Ref. 118]
The rioting would continue into May. Before the dust settled,
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a number of demonstrators were killed or wounded in clashes
with Syrian troops.
In response to the unrest Asad made the compromise of
inserting an article which stated that the president must be
Muslim. To erase the contradiction of his Alawi ancestry,
Asad recruited Musa al-Sadr, the Shi'i Imam of Lebanon, to
declare that Alawis were in fact Shi'ite Muslims. Asad also
enlisted the support of his fellow Alawis:
In a formal proclamation issued in 1973, 80 religious
personages, representing the various parts of the 'Alawi
country, unqualifiedly affirmed that their book is the
Qur'an, that they are Muslim and Shi'i, and like the
majority of Shi 'is, Ithna Ashariyyah or Twelvers, this is,
partisans of the 12 imams, and that whatever else is
attributed to them has no basis in truth and is a mere
invention by their enemies and the enemies of Islam. [Ref .
119]
Asad was nevertheless resolute in refusing to permit Islam to
be the declared state religion.
What is ironic in all of this is the fact that at no time
in the post-independence period of Syrian history had Islam
ever been recognized as the state religion. Given this
background information, Syrian unrest seems odd, but it is not
without explanation: While the widespread protests against
Asad were articulated in Islamic terms, the urban Sunnis who
participated in these disturbances were really expressing
their dissatisfaction with being excluded from the political
process. The riots and disturbances were organized and led by
members of the Muslim Brethren who played upon Sunni fears of
an Alawi dominated state. Although the opposition to Asad
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had, at its core, a group of devout Muslims genuinely
dedicated to the creation of an Islamic state, most of those
who took to the streets were more concerned with their
position vis-a-vis the government.
Ultimately the Constitution would be "approved" by
referendum in March of 1973. More importantly, all residual
opposition to Asad evaporated after the war with Israel was
fought, and would not surface again for three years. This was
no coincidence. By going to war with Israel Asad had managed
to eliminate, at least temporarily, those who challenged the
legitimacy of his regime. "The Islamic opposition fizzled
during the October 1973 war amid heightened popular feelings
of Arab nationalism as Syrians united behind their president
to fight the State of Israel." [Ref. 120] This lesson was
most certainly not lost on Asad. As a result, anti-Israeli
themes were especially prominent during the most trying years
of Asad's tenure, 1978 to 1982, the years of the Muslim
Brethren uprising.
C. 1978-1982: BATTLING THE MUSLIM BRETHREN
Having reclaimed his legitimizing credentials in the war
with Israel, Asad may have become over-confident in the years
that followed. This self-assurance likely contributed to his
decision to commit Syrian troops to Lebanon in .1976. Syria's
entanglement in Lebanon's civil war would breath new life into
the Muslim Brethren's dormant opposition movement. Asad's
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motivations for entering Lebanon's embroglio will be addressed
later; some might posit that Asad's decision to commit the
Syrian army to Lebanon contradicts the notion that Israel
serves a legitimizing function. That idea will be refuted.
The more pertinent issue to be entertained here is whether
anti-Israeli sentiments played a significant role in Asad's
campaign to defeat the Brethren. There can be little doubt
that many Syrians viewed Asad's policy choice in Lebanon as
aiding Israel. This perception inevitably contributed to the
development of the crisis which confronted Asad.
President Asad, as we have noted, restored his all-Arab
legitimacy in 1973. But in 1976 Asad again moved to
weaken, though not destroy, the Palestinian movement in
Lebanon by intervening alongside the mostly Maronite
Christian right wing to thwart the possibility of an even
more militant, revolutionary Arab nationalist, anti-
Israeli regime coming to power there. Unwilling to be
outbid or threatened by such a regime, and undoubtedly
worried about the Israeli response, President Asad again
sacrificed all-Arab concerns for local interests.
Significantly, however, his regime steadfastly reiterated
its previous support of the Arab and Palestinian causes
and insisted that its intervention in Lebanon was dictated
only by a desire to preserve those causes from their
misguided adherents. The question which Syrians,
Palestinians, and all others concerned with the Arab-
Israeli conflict "were left to ponder was whether (or when)
the Asad regime's seeming retreat on a core legitimizing
issue would lead to a renewal of the internal instability
of previous years. [Ref. 121]
The answer to the question is, of course, yes. But it would
be misleading to suggest that it was the perceived abandonment
of the confrontation with Israel which alone inspired the
uprising against Asad.
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Three other factors, which deserve brief mention,
contributed to the crisis. The first of these three, an
economic downturn, was a direct result of the intervention in
Lebanon. Syria's economy suffered badly as its army became
enmeshed in Lebanon's conflict. The economic pinch was
particularly acute for Syria's urban middle class, a section
of Syrian society which, when given cause, is predisposed to
bristle under the leadership of an Alawi president. Second,
the crisis was generated and sustained by the spread of
corruption
.
The Islamic insurrections at the turn of the decade were,
in part, led by the notables of the ancien regime never
reconciled to the Ba'thists and by scions of merchant and
religious families, particularly from the northern cities,
peripheralized by the growth of the state-controlled
economy and lacking patronage connections to protect their
interests. But the growth of corruption fueled resentment
among all those left out. Sympathy for the Islamic
challenge spread broadly among urban Sunnis, including the
salaried middle class the regime had long worked to co-
opt. [Ref. 122]
Finally, the Muslim Brethren were also buoyed by two external
developments: the Islamic revolution in Iran; and the
assassination of Sadat by fundamentalists in October of 1981.
While the uprising cannot be completely credited to Syria's
involvement in Lebanon, it was nevertheless the primary cause.
The Brethren officially declared jihad in 1976, not long
after Syria's invasion. At first the Brethren employed hit-
and-run tactics hoping to invite repressive reprisals by
Asad's regime in order to inspire wider discontent with his
rule. Significantly, Muslim Brethren rhetoric emphasized
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those issues which they felt would most effectively undermine
Asad's position--those relating to Israel. First, the
Brethren castigated Asad for his failure to recapture the
Golan Heights as well as for participating in talks,
orchestrated by US Secretary of State Kissinger, which led to
a disengagement treaty with Israel in May of 1974. Like it or
not, Asad had given Israel de facto recognition by signing
that treaty, a point not lost on the Brethren. Second, the
Brethren labeled Asad an American and Israeli "stooge" for his
decision to intervene in Lebanon.
Asad's actions vis-a-vis Israel had robbed him of
legitimacy and re-invigorated the Islamic opposition, two
developments not completely unrelated. According to Raymond
Hinnebusch: "Islamic movements mobilize against a state
suffering from a legitimacy crisis which is rooted in external
threat or societal troubles--the breakdown of old identities,
the rise of new inequalities. . .The more discredited the
existing order, the more broad-based the Islamic movement is
likely to be." [Ref. 123] Asad was keenly aware of the
threat posed by the Brethren in 1976--both to his regime and
to his person. It is no coincidence that he acquired his
first armored Cadillac that same year.
The Brethren intensified their attacks on the regime in
1978. By 1980 Muslim Brethren activities had become so
serious that Syrian authorities could no longer deny the
problem to the outside world. In March of that year Prime
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Minister Abdel-Raouf al-Kassem announced measures to be taken
to curb government abuses. These included releasing political
prisoners, easing martial law and purging corrupt directors of
state-owned companies. What the Prime Minister did not
announce was a campaign aimed at discrediting the Muslim
Brethren by casting them as accomplices of the United States
and Israel, while simultaneously reaffirming the regime's
anti-Israeli credentials. That campaign- -whether deliberate
or spontaneous--was sustained by Asad himself. "As early as
March 1980 he publicly accused the Central Intelligence Agency
of encouraging 'sabotage and subversion' in Syria so as to
bring 'the entire Arab world under joint US-Israeli
domination.'" [Ref. 124]
The Muslim Brethren's verbal attacks on Asad's religious
convictions seemed to have put the Syrian president on the
defensive. Speaking at an anniversary rally commemorating the
Baath Party's rise to power on March 8, Asad insisted he had
always been a devout Muslim: "But they do not want to accept
my Islam. " Asad followed that remark with a sarcastic slap at
his opponents: "Maybe I need a certificate of good conduct
from their masters in Washington. To do that I need to go to
Jerusalem to submit to the Israelis as Sadat has done." [Ref.
125] Thus, Asad attempted to turn the table by painting the
Brethren as accomplices of Israel.
Previously, Asad's Foreign Minister and longtime friend
' Abd al-Halim Khaddam had made similar contributions to the
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cause. In an interview published in a Baath Party newspaper,
Khaddam announced that the internal uprising was really a
battle against Israel: "We are fighting a great national
battle against Israel and Zionist and imperialist policy in
the region." When the reporter queried Khaddam about the
source of the terrorist activity in Syria, the Foreign
Minister responded: "Our assessment is that Israeli
intelligence is behind these operations. Of course it uses
certain Arab tools. But these operations are carried out in
the interest of Israel." In response to the reporter's
suggestion that Syria's disturbances might grow to resemble
the internal (and eternal?) problems of Lebanon, Khaddam said:
"These are the dreams of Israel. Syria's national unity is
not a subject of debate or doubt for any citizen in Syria, and
those who believe that Zionism can toy with Syria's national
unity are badly mistaken." [Ref. 126] Likewise, Prime
Minister Kassem declared that while martial law might be
eased, it could not be lifted entirely because "we are in a
state of war with Israel." [Ref. 127]
The threat that the Muslim Brethren posed to Asad was very
real. In June of 1980 Brethren terrorists managed to throw
two hand grenades at Asad when he was waiting to receive a
foreign dignitary at the government's Guest Palace. Asad
himself kicked one of the grenades away while his body guard
threw himself on the other, dying instantly. Asad immediately
satisfied his appetite for revenge. The next day in Palmyra,
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Asad's brother, Rif'at, led Asad's praetorian guard on a
killing spree at a prison where Muslim Brethren were being
held. Several hundred inmates were massacred.
The crisis would come to a boil--and to an end--in
February of 1982 with the uprising at Hama. After the
Brethren ambushed a government patrol, several thousand
troops, with the support of armor and artillery units, rushed
into the city to annihilate the insurgency. Before the
fighting was over, anywhere from 10,000 to 25,000 of Hama '
s
citizens had been killed. In an interview the following
month, Asad was anything but repentant, and continued to point
a finger at the United States and its "agent", Israel.
I have no doubt ' that this was an American intelligence
operation. I have proof of US involvement. It is of
three sorts. Some of the criminals have confessed their
contacts with US agents. Secondly, at Hama we confiscated
advanced communications equipment, and other equipment of
American origin, which could only have reached the
criminals with US approval and through the channel of US
agents. Thirdly, it was the State Department--in obvious
collusion with Muslim Brotherhood groups abroad--which
first broke the news of the Hama fighting. [Ref. 128]
Asad continued to beat anti-Israeli drums in public. At a
rally a month after Hama, Asad harangued the crowd: "Brothers
and sons, death to the criminal Muslim Brothers! Death to the
hired Muslim Brothers who tried to play havoc with the
homeland! Death to the Muslim Brothers who were hired by US
intelligence, reaction and Zionism!" [Ref. 129] Previously,
Asad had similarly declared: "This criminal band which is
called the Muslim Brotherhood every day is proving that it is
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an organization which serves only the imperialists and
Zionists." [Ref. 130]
Although brute force and anti-Israeli themes were an
essential ingredient of Asad's campaign to defeat the
Brethren, there were, admittedly, other factors at work which
played a hand in the Brethren's demise. First, what success
the Muslim Brethren enjoyed, as mentioned, had more to do with
Asad's unpopularity than with the merits of the ideology the
Brethren espoused. Second, the Brethren failed in their bid
to replace Asad with an Islamic government due to internecine
dissent, and the absence of charismatic leadership among the
Brethren themselves. The Brethren leadership "constantly
fragmented and it lacked a strong charismatic leader with
unquestioned authority in the movement who could rally wide
support: Syrian Islam had neither an al-Banna or a Khomeini."
[Ref. 131] Third, the Muslim Brethren movement, despite any
sympathies it enjoyed among the alienated middle class, was
primarily a rural phenomenon. "Syrian Islam failed to reach
many sectors of the large middle class, to link up with much
of the working class and to bridge the urban-rural gap, an
essential key to mass revolution." [Ref. 132] These failures,
combined with Asad's dedicated ruthlessness , made the
Brethren's defeat all but inevitable.
Incidentally, it is unclear what impact, if any, the
Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981 had on the
entire affair. On the one hand, the Knesset decision--at
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Begin 's behest--to permanently swallow up the Golan may have
worked to Asad's advantage by reinforcing the perception of
Israeli imperialism, thereby causing the Syrian people to
rally around their president. On the other hand, Asad's
inability to challenge the Israeli action may have only made
him appear impotent, thus giving credence to Brethren claims
that Asad was unworthy to lead the Syrian people because he
had failed to recapture the Golan.
There are four points worth remembering regarding Muslim
Brethren activities and Asad's response between 1978 and 1982
which are pertinent to this essay. First, many Syrians
believed that Asad's decision to intervene in Lebanon played
into Israeli hands. Misgivings with the president's conduct
contributed to the development of the crisis. Second, Asad--
having made the decision to intervene--knew that he was
vulnerable to accusations of being in complicity with the
Israelis. Consequently, Asad tried to pre-empt criticism by
reiterating his dedication to the contest with Israel. Third,
the Muslim Brethren--cognizant of Israel's legitimizing
function--not only tried to use anti-Israeli sentiments to
further their own cause, but also sought to exploit Asad's
vulnerability on Israeli issues. Fourth, Asad deliberately
tried to defeat the Brethren, and engender loyalty to his
regime, by relentlessly depicting the Brethren as Israeli and
American stooges.
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Strangely enough, the Israeli decision to invade Lebanon
later in 1982 had the effect of vindicating Asad, although by
the time the Israelis moved into Lebanon the Brethren's defeat
was already history. Nevertheless, the invasion gave succor
to Asad's regime. Not only did it dispel the notion that Asad
was somehow cooperating with Jerusalem, but it also gave the
Syrian army an opportunity to engage the Israelis, thereby
allowing Asad to reassert his anti-Israeli credentials. The
Israelis unwittingly assisted their most implacable foe.
V. THE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
Not all of Asad's policy choices neatly fit into the
paradigm described thus far. That is, some of Asad's
decisions appear to contradict the thesis that his regime is
dependent upon Israel as a source of legitimacy. There are
three specific items which naysayers would insist debunk the
argument as it has been made. They are: First, Asad's
decision in 1976 to enter Lebanon. Second, Syria's
participation in the international coalition opposing Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait. And finally, Syria's participation in the
subsequent peace process. A superficial consideration of
these subjects would indeed cast a shadow of doubt over the
thesis of this essay. A more penetrating treatment of these
topics will, however, handily reconcile them to the reality of
Israel's legitimizing function.
A. SYRIA ENTERS LEBANON IN 197 6
At a glance it seems odd for Syria to enter the Lebanese
civil war in 1976 on the side of the Christians if Asad were
indeed dependent upon Israel as a source of legitimacy for his
regime. On the surface, the invasion appeared to serve




To begin with, the decision to commit Syrian troops
necessarily meant the diversion of troops and resources away
from the Golan front facing the Israelis. Prior to 1976 the
Israelis had declared that they would not countenance a Syrian
incursion into Lebanon. In fact, the Israelis had gone so far
to state that such a move would be considered a casus belli.
But in 1976 Mordechai Gur, Israeli Chief of Staff, and Shlomo
Gazit, Chief .of Military Intelligence, had a change of heart.
"Gur and Gazit argued that the entry of Syrian forces into
Lebanon was not dangerous for Israel. They pointed out that
the two-front deployment of the Syrian army would benefit
Israel and they were convinced that Lebanon's complicated
problems would divert Syrian attentions from the Golan
Heights." [Ref. 133] By dividing his forces Asad appeared to
be aiding and abetting the Zionist occupation of Syrian
territory by weakening the Syrian position facing the Golan.
Furthermore, Syria's intervention appeared to come with US
approval and Israeli encouragement. Both parties wished to
see Lebanon's civil war come to an end. To facilitate Syria's
intervention, the US mediated an undeclared but nevertheless
very real accommodation between Israel and Syria which became
known as the 1976 Red Lines agreement. Asad agreed to three
conditions: The Syrian army would not enter southern Lebanon,
thus giving tacit recognition to Israel's security interests
there; Syrian forces would not deploy surface-to-air missile
batteries; and the Syrian air force would not be used against
Lebanese Christians. Such apparent collusion with Israel, no
matter how discreet, was impossible to keep from--and equally
difficult to justify to--the Syrian public.
Even more difficult for Syrians to understand was Asad's
decision to enter Lebanon on the side of the Christians. By
moving to crush the Palestinians, Asad appeared to be doing
Israel's bidding. If Asad were really interested in securing
his .regime's legitimacy, why would he do Israel the favor of
betraying the Palestinians?
Finally, Asad also sacrificed good relations with the
Soviet Union when he crossed into Lebanon. Soviet backing had
long been considered necessary if Syria was to pose a serious
challenge to Israel. By irritating the Soviets Asad was
jeopardizing Syria's ties with the one country which could act
to counterbalance Israel's patron, the United States.
Advocates of this counterargument fail to appreciate the
complex nature of Asad's decision to enter Lebanon, nor do
they stop to consider the possible repercussions of Asad
having chosen a different course of action. Asad's decision
did not boil down to a simple choice of either helping or
hurting Israel. The very nature of the situation was such
that whatever Asad chose to do, it would--in the short term--
work to the advantage of the Israelis, and therefore be to
Asad's detriment. But Asad is not a shortsighted leader. If
he were, he would have passed from the scene of Middle East
politics long ago.
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What Asad feared most of all was an Israeli invasion of
Lebanon, a very real possibility in the absence of Syria's
incursion. Anything less than an ephemeral Israeli presence
beyond southern Lebanon would have posed a greater long term
threat to Asad's regime. An unchallenged Israeli presence in
Lebanon in 1976 would have humiliated Asad by underscoring
Syrian impotence vis-a-vis Israel. But Asad was not ready to
confront an Israeli thrust into Beruit in 1976. It should not
be forgotten that Asad's highest priority was and is regime
survival. Failure to confront an Israeli incursion into
Lebanon would, in the long run, have triggered an even more
profound crisis of legitimacy than that created by the Syrian
intervention. But had he risked a confrontation with Israel
in 1976 by challenging their invasion of Lebanon--had an
Israeli invasion come to pass--Asad might well have endangered
the very existence of his regime. It was only three years
earlier that the Israeli army had stopped twenty-five miles
short of Damascus. Ultimately, of course, Asad's regime was
put at risk because his decision to go into Lebanon acted to
re-invigorate the Muslim Brethren. The threat posed by the
Brethren, however, was more difficult to anticipate; an
Israeli invasion not only appeared more certain, but also more
menacing. Moreover, Asad considered Lebanese-Syrian security
to be indivisible. An Israeli presence in Lebanon (north of
Sidon) was to be avoided at whatever cost.
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Even had the Syrian people permitted Asad to stand by
passively while Israeli swallowed up part of Lebanon--which
they would not--Asad would have surrendered his ability to
influence events in what he views as Greater Syria. If the
Palestinians were to be reined in, better that he should do it
than the Israelis.
Events in Lebanon would ultimately vindicate Asad's
foresight and decision-making. Although the Syrian air force
was humiliated, the army made a surprisingly good showing of
itself in its clashes with the Israeli Defense Forces after
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Moreover, Asad's
adroit political maneuvering was directly responsible for the
abrogation of the US-crafted Israeli-Lebanese agreement' of May
17, 1983. In the long run Asad gained considerable political
capital and legitimacy because of his handling of events in
Lebanon. Syria's continued presence in Lebanon is vivid
testimony to this reality.
Asad never abandoned Israel as a legitimizing tool when he
entered Lebanon in 1976. It was inevitable that Asad's anti-
Israel credentials would be tarnished to some degree, but that
was bound to happen regardless of the path he chose. On the
horns of a dilemma, Asad's challenge was to select the lesser
of two evils, and history shows that he chose wisely.
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B. SYRIA AND THE GULF CRISIS
Eight days after Saddam Hussein's tanks and armored
personnel carriers had rumbled into Kuwait and made it Iraq's
"nineteenth province, " Syria--at a hastily called emergency
Arab summit --voted, along with eleven other Arab states, to
condemn the invasion, and added its voice to the world chorus
demanding Iraq's unconditional withdrawal. This was not a
surprising course for Syria to take, and so it drew little
attention. Asad of Syria, after all, had for some time been
at loggerheads with Hussein of Iraq. Each man considered
himself to be in a publicity contest with the other for the
leadership of the true Baath Party, and the pan-Arab movement.
Asad had long sought to diminish Saddam's stature in the
region, and to do so had even given Syrian support to Iran in
its eight year war with Iraq. Thus, Asad was behaving in a
predictable fashion when Syria condemned Saddam's invasion.
Less than a week later Asad expressly endorsed the
deployment of US troops to the region--troops that would join
Syrian forces promised just three days before. This
announcement was not blithely overlooked by spectators of
Middle East politics. More importantly, the Syrian people
took notice, and they were unquestionably displeased. With
the United States and Israel being inextricably linked in the
Syrian mind, Asad's cooperation and participation in a US-led
effort against an Arab state was too much for many Syrians to
stomach.
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This unanticipated development, some would say, robs the
Israel-as-legitimizing-agent argument of its strength. It is
assumed that if Asad were truly dependent upon Israel to
legitimize his position, he would not have steered such a
seemingly contradictory foreign policy course during the Gulf
crisis and war. Instead, it is posited, Asad would have
chosen to align himself against the country which underpins
"Zionist imperialism," and would have cheered as Scuds rained
down on Tel Aviv. Such muddled thinking oversimplifies the
situation. A more careful examination of Syria's role in the
Gulf Crisis actually lends credence to the argument: Closer
scrutiny reveals how important opposition to the United
States--Israel ' s ally--is to the Syrian people. And that same
scrutiny also illustrates Asad's appreciation of that reality,
and how that constraint fit into his calculations and
maneuvering. In the end, the veracity of Israel's
legitimizing function will be reinforced.
Syria is a country where public opinion stays very
private. Nevertheless, Syrians were outspoken in their
opposition to the deployment of the Syrian army to the Saudi
peninsula. Many Syrians reacted with hostility, and in some
cases violence, to the idea of Syrian troops serving alongside
American troops. According to one Syrian: "We are not ready
to defend American interests in the Gulf. I would rather die
with honor fighting on the side of one Arab leader who dares
challenge the United States." [Ref. 134] Accordingly, Asad's
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decision to side with Israel's patron earned him the scorn of
the Syrian public.
There were some very tangible signs of this widespread
displeasure, as well as corresponding indications of
insecurity among the leaders in Damascus. Posters of Asad
were defaced throughout the Syrian capitol. Leaflets critical
of the Syrian alliance with the US were anonymously
distributed. As a result, the government barred Palestinian
groups sympathetic to Iraq from circulating their literature.
A BBC correspondent who reported the outbreak of riots in
Syria was expelled from the country. In fact, some government
authorities in Damascus quietly confided to foreign
dignitaries that an estimated eighty-five percent of the
Syrian public were opposed to Asad's Gulf policy. [Ref. 135]
While these figures may have been exaggerated in order to make
Syrian requests for Western financial assistance more
persuasive, there can be little doubt that Syrian
disenchantment was profound.
Why were the Syrians so upset? Several reasons for Syrian
anger are pertinent, illustrative, and therefore worth
enumerating. First of all, the Syrian reaction was reflexive.
For decades the Syrian government had fed its citizens an
unrelenting diet of anti-American and anti-Israeli propaganda.
But after Iraq's invasion, that very same government had
incongruously positioned Syrian troops, figuratively,
shoulder-to-shoulder with the vile, pro-Zionist forces of the
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US--against fellow Arabs no less! Indeed, that Asad had
removed the elite 9th Armored Division from the front facing
Israel along the Golan Heights, and had sent it to Saudi
Arabia made Syria's participation in the international
coalition that much more unpalatable.
Second, the sight of "infidel" military forces arriving in
the Holy Land infuriated many Syrians, even those who did not
claim to be devout Muslims: "I am not a pious Muslim, but
this US military force in Saudi Arabia makes me feel deep
anger." [Ref. 13 6] Asad's endorsement of the US presence made
him an accomplice in the defilement of Islam's sacred ground.
Third, a number of Syrians expressed their opposition to
their country's Gulf policy as an indirect means by which to
articulate their dissatisfaction with Asad. In other words,
many Syrians supported the Iraqi strongman simply because he
was Asad's opponent.
Fourth, Syrians found Saddam Hussein an attractive figure
because Saddam had successfully cultivated an image of himself
as--at least in Syria--an Arab leader who was ready to put his
army where his mouth was. On the other hand, Asad, who had
not waged all-out war on Israel since 19.73, was trying to
discourage the idea of an imminent conflict with the Jewish
state
.
The government's response to the ubiquitous misgivings of
the Syrian people is revealing. Asad's name in Arabic means
"lion, " and it is manifest that he is no kitten.
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Consequently, Asad reacted aggressively to counter the
undercurrent of resentment his policy had inspired. Asad
waged an energetic campaign to shape the public's view on Gulf
events, much in line with his oft-quoted adage that "It is not
public opinion that makes government, but government that
makes public opinion."
Asad directed Baath party leaders to dispatch teams
throughout the country to emphasize certain points to the
Syrian people. These points were: Syria--not Iraq--is the
custodian of the pan-Arab ideal; Syria had deployed troops to
the Saudi peninsula so that the crisis would not be
exclusively in the hands of foreigners; the Syrians were not
there to fight Iraq--the troop movement was strictly
defensive
.
More significant was a state-controlled media blitz
orchestrated by Asad. The Syrian media continued to bitterly
attack the US for' its support of Israel. In fact, in order to
satisfy the public, a dedicated anti-American campaign was
launched in October. It was so successful that some Western
analysts feared it foreshadowed Syria's withdrawal from the
coalition
The logic behind Asad's Gulf policy is relevant to, and
supportive of, the argument proposed in this essay. Among the
reasons Asad chose the policy he did was his conviction that
Saddam's action threatened Asad's long-term legitimacy
concerns vis-a-vis Israel. Specifically, Asad believed that
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the invasion made it that much more difficult to achieve his
number one foreign policy objective: the return of the Golan
Heights--potentially Asad's greatest legitimacy-building
device. According to former Ambassador to Syria Edward
Djerjian: "Asad feels that Saddam has acted to undermine the
principle of the inadmissability of the acquisition of
territory by force. If that's left unanswered, it will do
much to undermine the efforts of Asad to negotiate the return
of the Golan." [Ref. 137] In other words, if it was
acceptable for Saddam to take Kuwait by force, then it would
likewise be acceptable for Israel to take territory— the
Golan--in the same manner. Asad, then, had little choice but
to oppose Iraq's action. Asad also believed that Saddam had
recklessly jeopardized Syria's security by inviting a regional
war that would likely involve Israel. Asad realized that
risking his regime for the sake of building its legitimacy
made no sense whatsoever.
Asad also hoped to exchange his blessing of the US
presence in Saudi Arabia for a favorable negotiating position
with Israel in case of post-war peace talks. In doing so Asad
was sacrificing the short-term legitimacy of his regime for
the prospect of long-term gains. Although the possibility of
sitting down with the Israeli enemy to negotiate for the
return of the Golan had its own inherent, de-legitimizing
risks (as opposed to waging war to reclaim it), the prospect
of eventually getting back that Syrian land is conceivably--
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and paradoxically--the greatest legitimizing prize for which
Asad could aspire.
Finally, Asad understood that Syria could exchange its
acceptance of the US presence in the region for financial
rewards which would substantively improve his military
position versus Israel. Syria's greatest reward came from the
Saudis who contributed $2 billion, an enormous sum when one
considers that Syrian government budget for the previous year
had also been $2 billion. The Kuwaitis promised up to $500
million which had been withheld from Syria during the Iran-
Iraq war because of Syria's support for Iran. In addition to
these pledges, the Syrians worked to improve relations with
the West in order to unfreeze $150 million that was being
withheld by the European Community because of Syria's
sponsorship of terrorism. These monies supplemented that
which Syria earned as a result of the crisis itself. Unlike
most Arab countries which suffered economically from the
invasion, Syria had no trade with Iraq which had to be
severed, and few workers there who had to return home; because
of the resultant increase in the price of oil, Syria actually
made at least $200 million in surplus profits on its daily net
export of 130,000 barrels of oil during the crisis.
An alarming percentage of Syria's windfall was devoted to
arms purchases. In the months after the war Syria contracted
for the delivery of more than 150 North Korean Scud-C
ballistic missiles at an estimated cost of $500 million. This
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purchase was apparently made specifically with the Saudi
money--and with Saudi approval. T-72 tanks and Su-24 ground
attack aircraft were also purchased with Syria's Gulf crisis
money. Not surprisingly, Asad made no move to repay the more
than $1 billion of Syrian debt, which is in arrears, to
Western lenders. These newly acquired weapons are obviously
intended to strengthen Asad's hand in negotiations with the
Israelis and, barring that, ultimately contribute to the
forced reacquisition of Syria's Golan Heights. Thus, Asad was
able to substantially improve his regime's ability to regain
the Heights, and thereby solidify its legitimacy.
Overall, several lessons may be gleaned from Syrian
behavior over the period of the Gulf crisis. First, the
contest with Israel is a touchstone of legitimacy for the
Syrian people. If a government is conducting itself in such
a manner that the Syrian people sense it is surrendering an
advantage to the Israelis, or squandering an opportunity to
defeat the Jewish state, Syrians will articulate their
displeasure even under a dictator as repressive as Asad.
Second, Asad is keenly aware of Syria's political landscape,
but unlike the Syrian people at large, he is guided in his
decision-making by pragmatism and calculation, not passion.
Third, Asad's foreign policy decisions are ultimately
predicated upon how they will affect Syria's position versus
Israel. Although Syria's conduct during the Gulf crisis may
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have seemed extraordinary at the time, in fact it would have
been surprising had Asad chosen any other route.
C. THE PEACE PROCESS
Like the Syrian invasion of Lebanon in 1976 and Syria's
role in supporting the international coalition opposing Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait, Syria's participation in the recent peace
talks would seem to contradict the notion that Asad is
dependent upon perpetuating his country's contest with Israel.
If that were indeed the case, it is imagined, certainly Asad
would not jeopardize his position by making peace with Israel.
There- are a number of reasons to discard this challenge. To
begin with, this idea is founded upon the false supposition
that Israel and Syria define "peace" in the same terms. In
reality, the peace Syria seeks is very different from that
which Israel hopes to achieve. For Israel, "peace" means
more than simply a state of non-belligerency. Besides
removing the threat to their national security, the Israelis
also seek diplomatic and commercial ties. For the Israelis,
these are essential manifestations of Israel's acceptance by,
and in, the Arab world. Ultimately, Israel's international
legitimacy rests upon Arab endorsement of the Jewish state's
right to exist. As far as the Israelis are concerned, Arab
endorsement is measured in terms of diplomatic and commercial
relations. The mere absence of a threat will not suffice.
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Syria, on the other hand, does not appear ready to extend
these privileges to Israel under any circumstances--at least
not as long as Asad sits in office.
On a number of occasions [Asad] has reiterated Syria's
commitment to a comprehensive peace. He has accepted U.N.
Security Council Resolution 242 (subsumed in Security
Council Resolution 338 of 1973) calling for peace with
Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal from occupied
territories. But privately he has said that the state of
peace cannot include diplomatic and commercial relations
with Israel because, he says, Zionism is racist. [Ref.
138]
No one should be surprised with Asad's highly conditional
definition of peace; depending upon the context, the very use
of the term is problematic for Asad. When attempting to put
together the Madrid conference Secretary of State Baker stated
that the US objective of the conference was "peace treaties"
between the conflicting parties. Asad protested, however,
insisting that the term "peace treaties" was unacceptable.
Consequently, the term was deleted from the diplomatic lexicon
leading up to the talks. [Ref. 139]
Asad is so sensitive to the particulars of language and
meaning because he is ultimately encumbered by the Syrian
public's reaction to talks with Israel. Unlike Egypt in the
1970s, Syria is completely devoid of any internal pressures
for peace. This fact should not be misconstrued to mean that
the Syrians would necessarily object to a political solution.
"In certain circumstances they would perhaps be willing to
accept such a solution, provided it would ensure the
restoration of all Arab territories including the Golan
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Heights, and provided it did not require Syrian recognition
and normalization of relations with Israel." [Ref. 140]
Nevertheless, Asad must appear somewhat intransigent and
unwilling when it comes to talking peace, otherwise he risks
provoking an internal backlash against his regime. "Syria's
hard line on the Arab-Israeli dispute is not only about
territory but is bound up with Asad's search for legitimacy,
with his ambitions and with the survival of his government."
[Ref. 141]
With this in mind, Syrian behavior during the Madrid
conference makes considerable sense. The Syrians were,
without question, the most uncompromising of the Arab
delegations present in Madrid. Syrian rhetoric was strident
and confrontational . Significantly, Syria's Foreign Minister,
Farouk al-Sharaa, was the only representative who addressed
the gathering in Arabic, despite the fact that he speaks
excellent English. During his address, the Syrian Minister
waved a "Wanted" poster of Yitzhak Shamir that had been issued
by the British during the years of the mandate. Unlike other
delegations, the Syrians did not exchange smiles or even
handshakes with the Israelis.
Syria's demands were similarly inflexible. Farouk al-
Sharaa insisted that there was nothing to discuss until the
Israelis agreed to relinquish "every inch" of occupied Arab
land and grant self-determination to the Palestinians.
"Declaring that 'We love freedom, ' and that Arabs have always
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treated Jews in their land with 'grace and dignity, ' the
Syrian offered no hint of any softening in the virulently
anti-Zionist position Damascus has long championed." [Ref.
142] Syria's position was in stark contrast to the more
conciliatory tones struck by the other Arab delegations.
The Syrian delegation was also reluctant to participate in
any of the bilateral discussions which followed the initial
conference. Without the persuasive abilities of Secretary
Baker, Syrian participation at Madrid might have come to a
quick close. Although the Syrians eventually agreed to sit
down with the Israeli delegation, the meeting produced no
results. "Yossi Ben-Aharon of the Israeli delegation said the
meeting was 'cause for much frustration' and that Syria said
it would not discuss anything until Israel withdraws from
annexed and occupied territories." [Ref. 143]
The intransigent nature of the Syrian position invited a
good deal of criticism from the Western press. This, in turn,
provoked a noteworthy reaction from the Syrian Foreign
Minister: "I think the Israelis as a people desire peace.
They are looking for peace. Israel is a special case where
the government is more hawkish than the people. In the Arab
world, it is just the opposite. We are more flexible than the
Arab people." [Ref. 144] Although Sharaa's remark was
tailored for the Western press, it nevertheless revealed a
fundamental truth. Asad, pragmatic leader that he is, would
certainly welcome some kind of modus operandi with Israel--if
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the Syrian people were willing to accept it. Syria's publicly
articulated positions throughout the peace process are
carefully crafted insofar that they reflect two competing
elements: Asad's pragmatism and his people's strong anti-
Israeli stance. "If Syria's attitude towards the Arab-Israeli
conflict has been based on President Asad's pragmatic
assessment of what Syrians would accept, it has also been
influenced by what he could hope to achieve." [Ref. 145]
Asad also makes Syrian participation in peace talks
sufficiently palatable to the Syrian people by simultaneously
reiterating his willingness to use force should the talks
fail. His rhetoric conveniently dovetails with his desire to
negotiate from a position of strength. The large post-Gulf
War arms expenditures are the most visible manifestation of
this strategy.
The important issue for Asad is to convey the notion of
military threat to Israel. This appears to be succeeding,
as most of the reports about Syria's armament programme
are coming from Israel. The message is that Israel must
choose between a war to destroy Syria's military threat or
a peace settlement in which some key Arab demands are met.
Asad evidently hopes that there will be strong enough
international opposition to another war in the region and
support for UN resolutions calling on Israel to withdraw
from occupied territory to ensure that the peace option
prevails. [Ref. 146]
Because Syria is not prepared to go to war immediately on the
heels of failed peace talks--if that event should transpire--
Asad will, in the interim, pointedly put the blame for the
failure on Israel's doorstep. This facile demonization of
Israel ultimately works to his regime's advantage.
101
It is impossible to know, but the breakdown of the peace
talks may very well be what Asad is banking on. Should the
talks fail, the "threat" that peace with Israel poses for Asad
will no longer exist. It is also possible, however--and
perhaps more likely--that Asad senses that the best
opportunity for peace, as he defines it, is possible only by
cooperating with US efforts in the region. And if those
efforts fail, his cooperation with the US may assist him in
compensating for that failure by undergirding alternative
sources of legitimacy.
With an eye on the strategic long term, Asad has
calculated that his interest in finding a new source of
legitimacy for his minority Alawite regime based on
Syria's civil development would be better served by
securing Syria's place in the new US regional order--which
the Madrid process could help shape--than by risking
exclusion. [Ref. 147]
It is too early to know if this is in fact the case. For the
time being, Syria's foreign policy path throughout the peace
process has clearly been designed with domestic considerations
in mind. To have done otherwise would have risked diminishing
Asad's already tenuous credibility, and legitimacy, at home.
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VI. CONCLUSION- -IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY
The reality of Israel's legitimizing function has a
significant impact on the formation of US policy choices in
its relationship with Syria. These choices have been made
more complex, however, by the recent changes in the
international system. With the loss of its patron, the Soviet
Union, Syria seems poised--if only by necessity--to engender
better ties with the Western world. Should the US give Syria
what it wants? Or is that even possible? If the US chooses
to take a more accommodating approach with Syria, what--if
anything--can the US reasonably expect in return? Policy
planners must necessarily consider Israel's role in Syrian
politics if they are to properly craft the answers to these
important questions.
There is a related subject, however, which is all too
frequently overlooked in discussions which aspire to influence
the character of US-Syrian relations. Alarmingly, that
subject is a rudimentary one; the primary concern in
discussing it revolves around determining the merits of a long




A. SYRIA AFTER ASAD
Obviously US policy should not be predicated upon the
assumption that Asad will remain in power indefinitely. While
Asad's regime appears immune to the threat of a coup d'etat,
it is much more vulnerable to the fickle nature of Asad's
health. The Syrian President suffers from a number of
ailments, including diabetes. In November of 1983 Asad was
hospitalized for exhaustion, although some suspect it may have
been for a heart problem. Asad's sedentary lifestyle,
combined with an irregular diet and long work hours have taken
a physical toll. Although he is only sixty-one years old,
Asad's health is so poor that he could succumb at any time.
This raises an important question: Will Asad's successor
similarly depend upon Israel as a legitimizing agent? If not,
Syria's freedom of action in Middle East affairs and US
opportunities to encourage stronger ties to Syria would be
simultaneously advanced with Asad's demise.
The answer is completely contingent upon who Asad's
successor is. It is impossible to finger a specific
individual because Asad has deliberately avoided picking
anyone. Nor has he permitted any individual to position
himself as a possible successor. The task of anticipating a
successor has been made more difficult because Asad has
"carefully rotated many of the leading Alawi officers and
played them off against one another to ensure that they do not
build up enough power to threaten him. But if there is no one
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powerful enough to threaten him, logically there is no one
powerful enough to succeed him." [Ref. 148] There is some
speculation that Asad's son Basil is being groomed as a
possible successor. In December of last year the thirty-two
year old army major was entrusted with an official state visit
to Saudi Arabia. Although Basil is well regarded in certain
political circles, if Asad were to die in the very near
future, it seems unlikely that his son would be adequately
prepared to step into his place.
Because the upper hierarchy of the Syrian army is
dominated by Alawi military officers, it is most likely that
Asad's replacement will emerge from that organization. Asad's
replacement need not necessarily be an individual, however.
According to Alasdair Drysdale, Syria might for some time be
ruled by a collective leadership of Alawi officers who would
chose a Sunni officer to front for them, much like Jadid had
done with Atasi in the 1960s. The likelihood that such an
arrangement would persevere for any length of time seems
doubtful. Eventually--and probably sooner than later--a
single individual, almost certainly an Alawi, would emerge
from this collective body to rule Syria. Like Asad, he too
will need to legitimize his position.
Unfortunately, it is less likely that this individual will
possess the political acumen of Asad. Given Syria's tradition
of frequent coups prior to Asad's rise to power, Syria could
be at risk of falling into this pattern once again.
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Consequently, anyone who follows Asad may feel compelled to
solidify his position by endearing himself to the Syrian
people. A military confrontation with Israel could be the
preferred means by which to accomplish this. As it is, the
Syrian army leadership is much more eager to engage Israel
than Asad has been. "The Syrian army demonstrates relative
solidarity on issues such as the strategy of confrontation
with Israel. Generally, Syrian military personnel favor
greater military action and fewer concessions in the conflict
with Israel." [Ref. 149] These circumstances, combined with
the arsenal Asad has thus far amassed, makes a post -Asad Syria
a greater menace to Israel's security.
The urgency of reaching a Syrian-Israeli accommodation
before Asad passes from the scene is therefore great, but it
may not be very realistic. After all, what can be done to
circumvent the impediment of Israel's role in Syrian politics?
B. WHILE ASAD IS STILL AT THE HELM
Waiting for Sunni Moslems to rise up and overthrow Asad or
his successor--or even encouraging it--before the US seriously
tries to cultivate ties with Syria is an available policy
option. A Sunni led government would be in a better position
to take international political risks without alienating the
Syrian people. But electing to stand passively on the
sidelines and wait is a defeatist and potentially catastrophic
policy choice. Moreover, Asad could conceivably live another
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twenty years, or even longer. And as long as he is in power
he will be able to rock the Middle East boat whenever he
believes that doing so serves his interests. Most disturbing
is the possibility of war if Asad senses the failure of the
current peace talks. US attempts to isolate Syria might only
exacerbate the situation and could provoke Asad to lash out in
order to maintain Syria's relevancy. Therefore, the best
course of action is to engage the Syrians if for no other
reason than to avert disaster.
Despite all the good reasons for doing so, courting Asad
is not without its substantive risks. Certainly his
cooperation is needed to restore and maintain order in
Lebanon, and an Arab-Israeli peace, however it is defined, is
impossible without him. Moreover, he is a cautious
politician, and when he makes agreements he can be relied upon
to keep them. Nevertheless, the "Lion of Damascus" has blood
on his paws, and cultivating a close relationship with him is
an unsavory task for the United States. It was not long ago
that cooperation with the "Butcher of Baghdad" was
rationalized in similar terms.
The US must do business with Asad. On that point there
can be no question. The more pertinent issues are: first, how
to do it without repeating the mistakes made with Saddam
Hussein and Iraq; and two, how to do it in spite of Asad's
need to use Israel as a legitimizing agent.
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The best long term course for the US to take would be to
encourage Asad to divorce his regime's legitimacy from Israel.
In its place Asad should emphasize the economical development
of Syria. It has already been mentioned that economic well-
being can serve as a "veritable wellspring of legitimacy."
But the careful reader will also recall the caution that it
would be "folly" for Asad to pursue economic goals as his
primary source of legitimacy. For the better part of Syria's
history under Asad this was certainly true; the Cold War and
Soviet sponsorship made the idea of basing his regime's
legitimacy on economic development a fool's choice. Although
the Soviets were involved in some projects to improve Syria's
infrastructure, this was certainly not their primary concern.
In any case, the old rules no longer exist. As the shadow of
the Cold War recedes, new opportunities are available to the
leadership in Damascus, and Washington.
Replacing Israel with economic development as the primary
source of legitimacy in Syria is, admittedly, a goal replete
with shortcomings. It is enormously ambitious, perhaps
idealistic. It requires consistency in foreign policy, a
sometimes rare commodity in the US where political leaders are
predisposed to work for the short-term gain. Measuring
results is problematic, maybe impossible. After all,
legitimacy is not tangible, and therefore defies calculation.
Finally, long-term plans may be undone, as they are subject to
the capricious politics and instabilities of the Middle East
.
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Nevertheless, cultivating greater concern for the economy
among Syria's political leaders is no less ambitious than
trying to make peace between Israel and the Arabs--indeed, it
is considerably more modest--and to do the former may in fact
contribute to accomplishing the latter. Making the economy
instead of Israel Syria's primary legitimizing agent is a two-
part proposition: First, Asad must de-emphasize Israel;
second, the Syrian economy must correspondingly be
revitalized. Both parts of this strategy must be implemented
if it is to succeed. The economy, for example, no matter how
prosperous, could never supersede Israel as a legitimizing
agent as long Syrian attitudes towards Israel do not change.
To accomplish the first part of this strategy, the US must
pursue two specific aims. First, the US must discourage
Israeli conduct which perpetuates prevailing Syrian images of
the Jewish state and its leadership. Israel's annexation of
the Golan Heights in 1981, and its constant settlement
activities in the occupied territories, for example, only play
into Asad's hands. If the Israelis were really interested in
undoing Asad's regime, more accommodating behavior might very
well have the desired effect. (Of course, it is quite
possible that Israel prefers that Asad be in control in
Damascus. There may be a mutually dependent, legitimizing,
and stabilizing relationship at work--albeit unspoken- -between
the hard-line regimes in Jerusalem and Damascus.) Renouncing
Israel's annexation of the Golan would be a no-cost confidence
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building measure--at least in terms of security--f or a newly
elected Israeli government to take. But such a move could
only realistically be expected with a Labor party victory, and
perhaps not even then given prevailing public sentiment in
Israel. Although detailing specific inducements the US could
offer to encourage such an Israeli move is beyond the scope of
this essay, it should be noted that financial arrangements
have proven useful in the past. At the same time, US
resistance to the continuing settlement activity is necessary
in order to rob Syria of Israel's utility as a legitimizing
agent
.
Second, the US must insist that the government-controlled
Syrian media tone down and eventually eliminate inflammatory
and strident anti-Israeli/US rhetoric; no more dedicated anti-
US campaigns. Asad need not shower Israel or the US with
compliments, but the government must stop demonizing Israel.
Although it would be unrealistic to expect the Syrian
government to rehabilitate the Syrian image of Israel or the
US, the government need not encourage or provoke the
articulation of anti-Israeli sentiments.
The second part of this strategy involves granting Syria
a number of economic awards in return for certain behaviors
which serve US interests. For example, Syrian sponsorship of
terrorism has long been an impediment to US-Syrian ties. If
Syria is serious about coaxing US investment, it is reasonable
for the US to expect cooperation with the enforcement of UN
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sanctions on Libya. In recent days the Syrian government has
flirted with the possibility of ignoring the UN action.
Although this may reflect Syrian complicity in the bombing of
Pan Am Flight 103, ignoring the UN sanctions is unacceptable
behavior and the US should accordingly convey its displeasure
with the prospect of Syria flaunting them. In addition, Asad
should expel those terrorist groups who presently have
sanctuary within Syria. Most notably, this includes Ahmed
Jibril and his Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--
General Command. In November of 1990 when President Bush met
Asad in Geneva, Asad was queried about Ahmed Jibril by the
American delegation. The Syrian leader was asked why he was
harboring the terrorist. "Mr. Asad responded with a 'tongue
in-cheek speech' about how if Mr. Jibril were extradited to
the US, he would probably get out on bail, hire a high-priced
defense lawyer, and if acquitted, ask for a green card." [Ref.
150] Such light-hearted side-stepping of so serious a subject
is obnoxious, and the US should make it clear to Asad that
progress on this issue is a prerequisite for US economic
assistance
.
Other US expectations should include: Eventual Syrian
withdrawal from Lebanon in accordance with the Taif accords;
payment on the more than $1 billion in debt to Western
lenders; and the redirection of Syrian resources away from
arms purchases and towards indigenous economic development,
particularly for projects relating to Syria's infrastructure.
Ill
A secretly coordinated quid pro quo arrangement between Israel
and Syria whereby Israel renounced its Golan annexation in
return for the drawdown of some Syrian forces deployed along
that front would be a way of linking some of the specific
parts of this strategy together. It is not unreasonable to
expect Syrian cooperation on most of these points. Most of
the issues— terrorism, the Taif Accords, and repayment of
debt--do not threaten Asad's legitimacy with respect to
Israel
.
There is another reason to approach these ambitions with
optimism: After long but unremitting pressure, Asad was
recently persuaded to give Syria's 4,000 Jews the right to
travel abroad. This foreign policy success is demonstrative
of US ability to encourage desirable Syrian behaviors.
The US is not without the means to influence Syrian
behavior. Daniel Pipes detailed some of the economic
"carrots" the US has at its disposal in a recent issue of
Foreign Affairs:
Damascus remains a beneficiary of the Generalized System
of Preferences, a program that allows poor countries to
export manufactured goods to the United States with
reduced duties, though it may fail the provisions
concerning workers' rights and terrorism. The Syrians are
not required to reciprocate for commercial benefits they
already enjoy, particularly access to American oil fields.
The Syrians seek money on the American financial markets
and in American commercial investment in Syria and trade.
These can be denied. In addition credits can be withheld,
most-favored nation status denied and government -backed
insurance refused. [Ref. 151]
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In addition, the US could convince other Arab nations to
assist US efforts with Syria. Specifically, the Saudis might
be persuaded not to contribute to Syrian arms purchases in the
future; recall that it was Saudi money which subsidized the
purchase of Scud missiles for Syria after the Gulf War.
This strategy is not without its risks for all parties
involved. But diplomatic rewards are rarely forthcoming in
the Middle East in the absence of risk. Unfortunately, the
most laudable of US goals--a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace-
-is unattainable without certain changes in the political
landscape of the region. One of the features that must be
changed is Israel's legitimizing function in Syrian politics.
Altering that feature of the political landscape will take
time, patience, and unremitting effort. But without that
change, a lasting and true peace will remain elusive.
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